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ABSTRACT

With the rise in frequency and magnitude of natural disasters, there is a need to break down
monolithic organizational barriers and engage with community volunteers. This calls for ease
of systems interoperability to facilitate communication, data-sharing and scalability of real-time
response, essential for crisis communications. We propose two scalable frameworks that enable
multi-agency interoperability and real-time data-sharing. The first framework harnesses the power
of social media, artificial intelligence, and community volunteers to form an extended rescue-andresponse network that alleviates call center burden and augments the finite capacity of dispatch
units. Through an “online 9-1-1” service, affected people can request help and be automatically
triaged and routed to the closest response unit registered within the system. By connecting first
responders, dispatchers, victims and volunteers, this approach can enable communities to respond
effectively to large-scale disasters by having humanitarian organizations be a proactive and reactive part of the Public Safety Network. Delay analysis shows that the online 9-1-1 system has an
expected response time comparable to the traditional system, with the added benefit of call center
and dispatch scalability. The second framework enables data sharing between different agencies
by allowing on-demand access to data protected by institutional policies. This is achieved through
a custom, reactive Software-Defined Networking module in the Floodlight controller that communicates with an external server to get information about registered agencies and then pushes those
traffic paths automatically to the respective domain’s network device flow tables. This approach
eliminates the need to have a global, consistent view of the network topology, and the resulting
controller-to-controller communication and coordination which can be especially challenging in
large networks. This framework has applicability in many areas, including scientific data sharing
among universities or research institutions, patient data sharing among hospitals or between first
responders quickly accessing critical medical information on-demand at a disaster site.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION

1.1

The Rise of Disasters

Natural disasters have been the bane of humanity in the recent years [1], causing not just casualties
but having a huge impact on economy for rebuilding the community. Some communities have
seen a disaster while they were still reeling from the aftermath of previous disasters. Munich Re’s
NatCatSERVICE is one of the world’s most comprehensive databases for analyzing and evaluating
natural catastrophes and shows the trends over the last four decades in terms of hydrological,
meteorological, climatological and geophysical events [1]. The chart in Figure 1.1 shows that the
recorded events per year have more than tripled since 2004. As an example, 50% of the 20 most
destructive wildfires in California’s history have been within 2010 to 2014. These catastrophes
are increasing in frequency and intensity; and subsequently, we see an increase in the losses of
lives, infrastructure and economy. The costliest year since 1980 has been 2011 with 350 billion
US dollars in economic loss due to Japan’s earthquake and the resulting tsunamis and nuclear
accident. The recorded losses in 2017 stood at 330 billion US dollars, second-highest since 1980,
due to hurricanes, wildfires, earthquakes, and flooding as shown in Figure 1.2 [2]. The horrific
wildfires of Australia in late 2019 – early 2020 destroyed more than 27 million acres of land, killed
34 people and 1.25 billion animals, and had a long-term impact on biodiversity with Australia
being home to 7-10% of earth species [3, 4].

1

Figure 1.1: Natural catastrophes have been on the rise since 1980, with number of recorded events
more than tripled in 2019 as compared to 2004. (Source: munichre.com)

1.2

The Challenges for Public Safety Communications During Disasters

1.2.1

Interoperability: Agencies, Systems, Vendors, and Carriers

When disaster strikes, the first people on the scene are typically policemen, fire fighters, and emergency medical paramedics and technicians. They face several challenges in terms of fragmented
information, each having its own information system; for example, the emergency medical technician on site may not have access to patient records. The issues are compounded by large scale
disasters when the lack of interoperability between multiple agencies’ systems (fire, EMS, law enforcement, state, county, federal) hinders effective communication and impacts the response operation. Agencies may have different Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems, different databases,
camera networks, vehicular networks, etc. There is a need for ubiquitous inter-agency communication and real-time knowledge sharing to support mission-critical operations and help garner better
situational awareness to aid timely decision making for resource allocation. This communication
2

Figure 1.2: Overall and insured losses from 1980-2017, shows losses on the rise, with 5,200 billion
in US dollars in losses, the costliest being meteorological disasters. (Source: munichre.com)

relies on both wired and wireless networks, private or commercial like AT&T and Verizon. During
disasters, infrastructure (e.g., cell towers) may be damaged that consequently impacts coverage.
Commercial networks have a reliance on power as well. During disasters, if the power grid is
impaired, then commercial networks impacted by that power outage are non-operational as well.
Network capacity can also be impacted during disasters, as public may be using the network for
sharing data and streaming videos of the disaster. Quality-of-Service (QoS) guarantees are needed
to prioritize public safety traffic over user traffic.
In this dissertation, we tackle the interoperability challenges of public safety communication sys-

3

tems by network layer techniques that respect policies and rules of agencies while allowing access
to each other’s data stores.

1.2.2

Scalability

Communication is key to survival in any disaster scenario. Social media has become a mainstream
mode of communication and the new generation is increasingly dependent on it. During widescale disasters, with people unable to reach 9-1-1, we saw an increased use of social media for
communicating with friends and community, and people seeking help and getting connected with
others would could act as a mediary for getting the help to them. Additionally, social media has
been used as a powerful tool for propagating information following natural disasters like the Haiti
earthquake [5]. During the 2016 Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, Facebook was used by the
nightclub to alert its followers to run out of the nightclub; and it was also used by the survivors
to inform their loved ones that they were safe [6]. During Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, stranded
people shared their locations with emergency officials over popular social media networks like
Twitter, Facebook and Instagram, and also shared pictures to aid officials to gauge the severity of
the situation [7, 8].
According to the National Emergency Number Association (NENA), Public Safety Answering
Points (PSAPs) should strive to meet 9-1-1 call-taking metric of answering 90% of calls within 15
seconds and 95% calls within 20 seconds [9]. This is in concert with the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) and the Association for Public Safety Communications Officials (APCO).
The reality, however, is that 9-1-1 call centers are currently under-staffed with an estimated 240
million 9-1-1 calls per year, and this shortage impacts call-answering times. In 2017, three percent
of the calls took more than 60 seconds to be answered [10]. In some cases, these delays have
resulted in harm to individuals, including death. With a huge influx of 9-1-1 calls expected during

4

a catastrophic event such as a hurricane or earthquake, this short supply of call-takers can intensify
the issue and there is a need to scale the personnel-constrained PSAPs so that the calls are being
answered within the desirable thresholds.
To meet the sudden burst of calls during emergencies, we propose a scalable framework based
on social media platform and community engagement. To meet the scalability demands of multiple organizations forming a communication network for secure data access to their datasets, we
propose a scalable networking layer based on software-defined networking

1.2.3

Real-time Operation: Response Rime

Scalability becomes an issue for real-time communication. In particular, response time becomes
an issue in large-scale disaster events. Response time, defined as the time between an emergency
notification to a PSAP and the time it takes for first responders to arrive on the scene, is a key
performance indicator of how well the emergency services are meeting the emergency needs. According to the World Health Organization, the desired response time is less than eight minutes [11].
As cities become more and more populous, and transportation infrastructure strained, meeting the
response time metric becomes even more critical especially for catastrophic events when many
people are impacted, transportation and communication infrastructure may be impaired and rescue
resources may be limited.
In this dissertation, we propose frameworks that are suitable for real-time response operations. In
the context of PSAP operations, we do a delay analysis and comparison with traditional 9-1-1 and
show that it will perform better in the case of large disasters. We also propose a Software-Defined
Networking architecture for multi-agency communication that not only addresses the first two
challenges of scalability and interoperability of communication during disasters but also satisfies
real-time requirements. This is achieved by implementing a reactive SDN application to dynami5

cally cater to new traffic flows between agencies that want to enable data sharing of information in
their respective domains.

1.3

1.3.1

Technology to the Rescue

Social Media Use During and After Disasters

According to wearesocial.com, as of January 2020, there are almost 3.8 billion people worldwide
engaged in using social media, and about 5.19 billion people own mobile devices spending about
2.5 hours per person per day on average on mobile social media apps [12]. Social media has
already been seen used during disasters to seek help, locate victims, get an update on the safety of
loved ones, for example, Facebook’s Safety Check feature [13]. So, how can we use social media
to solve the challenges mentioned in the previous section during large scale disasters?
In the US, about 240 million calls are made to 9-1-1 yearly, while there are 5,783 9-1-1 call centers
according to December 2017 statistics [14]. The traditional 9-1-1 service suffers from scalability
issues, especially in the case of major disasters when there is a huge influx of callers facing a
limited number of 9-1-1 call takers or agents, resulting in prolonged call-wait times for people
who may not get heard until it is too late and the caller’s battery dies out [15]. During Hurricane
Harvey, for example, some callers could not even get connected to 9-1-1 service [16].
Furthermore, communication through a reliable infrastructure is key for connecting these first responders with the victims, and there is a lot of emphasis for not having these calls fail. The 9-1-1
telecommunications network is not immune from infrastructure/network failures. In December
2018, the telecommunications giant CenturyLink suffered a nation-wide 37-hour outage that created a service unavailability for 17 million customers and 9-1-1 calls were not connected in at least
886 cases [17]. During this outage, there was a house fire in Boston and it was reported using an
6

Figure 1.3: As of Jan 2020, there are almost 3.8 billion active social media users. (Source: wearesocial.com)

old-fashioned street alarm operational since 1852 which sent a Morse code to dispatchers to send
first responders to that location [18]. In June 2020, T-Mobile – the third largest cellular provider
in the US with over 86M subscribers – suffered a 13-hour outage that impacted 9-1-1 calls [19].
These examples highlight the need for parallel, alternate emergency notification systems. These
outages are taken seriously by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) which fined AT&T
$5.25 million for the March and May 2017 9-1-1 outages that resulted in about 12,600 and 2,600
unsuccessful calls to 9-1-1 [20, 21] and settled a fine of $17.5 million with T-Mobile for two 9-1-1
outages in August 2014 [22].
In situations where legacy infrastructure services are entirely or partially unavailable, social media
can become the SOS network needed by victims to seek and reach rescue service in a manner
similar to 9-1-1 call service. Putting SOS requests over social media network like Twitter requires
integration of several components, which we undertake in this work.
7

Not only did we see the affected victims and emergency officials use social media, but also saw
an increase amongst volunteers in the use of social media to locate stranded people requesting
help. In Texas, a fleet of volunteer boat owners, Cajun Navy, participated in Hurricane Harvey
(2017) rescue efforts by using various apps [23]. One of the apps that they used is Zello [24],
a walkie-talkie like app that works on WiFi or cellular data network and allows rescuers to talk
over private channels to coordinate their efforts. There are several challenges that arise with such
efforts, including coordination with officials from multiple agencies, lack of overall prioritization
of efforts, and incomplete feedback loops [25, 5].
In addition to frantic 9-1-1 calls, there is a lot of activity immediately after disasters that depends
on communication networks, like people sending text message to loved ones, response teams being mobilized, and volunteers jumping in to help and trying to get in touch with victims. Much
coordination is needed and time is of essence. Technology comes to the rescue to serve all these
activities; especially with devices getting smaller and more powerful, real-time data is being shared
with pictures and videos that grant situational awareness to response and rescue teams. Technology can be efficiently leveraged for ad-hoc coordination between response teams, and relaying
information quickly to responders and volunteers that may be critical for saving lives.

1.3.2

Using Software-Defined Networking to Address Scalability and Interoperability

Another well-known issue is the need for reliable communication networks and information systems [26], which was a harsh awakening in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Katrina
opened our eyes to several issues that challenged officials in their search and rescue efforts, like
failure of infrastructure, delay in restoring landline networks, unavailability of a common framework for different agencies like Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), local police,
Red Cross to communicate and share information rapidly and accurately. In particular, we focus
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on real-time applications such as public safety reinforcement or multi-agency information sharing, and hence, explore the delay involved in access provisioning over multi-agency distributed
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) setups. Standardized network architecture and communication protocols are needed so that different emergency-serving agencies can be interoperable during
times of disaster. This motivation will result in the ability for agencies to communicate among
their own devices as well as across other agencies in a seamless manner reducing response time
and focusing on saving lives.
In traditional SDN, network control is decoupled from the physical infrastructure via a central
control plane with a centralized controller that has a global view of the network topology. This
approach does not work for large networks, which requires multiple controllers. This results in
challenges of coordinating between the controllers, determining optimum location of controllers,
and synchronization issues, etc. We present an architecture that can be leveraged by multiple controllers residing in different SDN domains to participate in secure data access. We implement a
reactive SDN application in Floodlight 1 that uses this architecture to send flow rules and instructions to the participating switches.

1.4

Dissertation Organization

This dissertation is organized as follows:
We describe the motivation for this work in Chapter 1, where we talk about the trend in natural
catastrophes in the past 40 years, for example hurricanes, earthquakes and flooding. Next, we
highlight some of the key communication and coordination challenges for first responders and
other public safety agencies during these large scale disasters, i.e., interoperability, scalability and
1 https://floodlight.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/floodlightcontroller
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real-time response. To solve these challenges, we discuss the potential of technology, specifically
social media and community engagement; as well as the multi-domain capability of softwaredefined networking.
Chapter 2 presents some background of key terminology and technology concepts that have been
referenced in this dissertation, for example, how traditional 9-1-1 calling centers operate; what is
software-defined networking and how is it used to manage network devices; how to emulate SDN
using Mininet and a traffic generator for realistic traffic flows. This is followed by a discussion
on related work in scaling 9-1-1 rescue and response operations. For example, how social media
has been used during disasters and following disasters for communication; how chatbots have
been used for conversations on social media; and how volunteers efforts have been coordinated
in recent wide-scale disasters. Thirdly, this chapter discusses the related work in multi-domain
software-defined networks, describes what sort of applications are typically run in such multidomain control layer and what are the challenges of working with multiple controllers which is the
case when dealing with different domains.
Chapter 3 presents our scalable communication framework, Smart Public Safety Framework (SPSF)
for running a service like 9-1-1 on a social media platform. This framework has multiple modules
to scale the handling of incoming requests through social media streams in real-time; can automatically track, analyze and triage requests; and can assign requests to appropriate dispatch teams.
Additionally, the framework presents how civilian organizations and community volunteers can
be engaged to scale rescue efforts to provide much-needed support and assistance to first responders. The chapter then uses Twitter as an example, and describes what the Twitter request handling
protocol would look like under this framework. We also present the delay analysis of such a call
handling protocol versus the traditional 9-1-1 call answering protocol.
Chapter 4 presents our multi-agency, reactive and distributed Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
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scalable architecture. It describes the different components of this architecture such as the Floodlight Controller, the reactive SDN application that runs on the controller, the OpenFlow interface
for the SDN controller to communicate with the network switches; and the Registered Agency
List (RAL) server that is used as a trusted third-party for agencies participating in this secure data
sharing architecture. The chapter describes how the reactive SDN application uses the RAL server
to handle inter-domain traffic to enable secure data access among different organizations. We include the delay analysis for the overhead introduced by the architecture’s reactive SDN application
layer and show that it matches our simulation. We also include a proof-of-concept of running this
application on a network emulator like Mininet.
Chapter 5 showcases the implementation of our experimental study comprising of Mininet topologies for sender and receiver networks, traffic generation and measurement, SDN controller module
implementation for TCP and UDP traffic flows, and the client-server code for the communication exchange between the RAL server and the SDN controllers. Then, we analyze the impact of
varying flow rule idle timeouts on different traffic rates, and measure the average hit ratio of the
flow tables and the reactive versus proactive delays. We also compare the measurements with our
theoretical model of the hit ratio and flow table size, and present our discussion and challenges.
Concluding remarks are presented in Chapter 6 by summarizing the contributions of this work and
how the challenges presented in Chapter 1 were addressed through the two key communication
frameworks presented in this dissertation. Furthermore, the chapter highlights some areas of future
research that might be of interest to the reader.

11

CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

2.1.1

Overview of Key Concepts

How Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) Work

In North America, the 9-1-1 system was established in 1968, as a national emergency number to
connect victims to fire, police and medical services in an emergency like accidents, house fire,
cardiac arrest, etc. [27]. People can dial 9-1-1 during emergencies and will be connected with a
9-1-1 operator (specially trained call taker) who gets information about the location and nature of
the emergency in order to categorize the call, i.e., fire, emergency medical services (EMS) and
law enforcement, and prioritize it according to the severity of the emergency before sending an
appropriate dispatch unit to handle the emergency. Additional requested information may include
caller identity, callback number, clothing description of responsible party, location verification, etc.
The 9-1-1 calls are routed to a call center known as a Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) where
the dispatcher’s Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system is configured to automatically receive
location information of the caller. Location information is the most critical piece for successful
emergency dispatch. If the call was made via a landline, then the Public Switched Telephone
Network (PSTN) shares an Automatic Number Identification (ANI) with the PSAP and the 9-1-1
operator can use the ANI to find the corresponding location address in a special database called
the Automatic Location Identification (ALI) database. If, however, the call originated from a
cell phone, then there are two approaches to locating the cell phone’s location: Either the cell
towers can triangulate the device location; or, for newer phones, the device enables GPS during
an emergency call to share its location with a secure server. The 9-1-1 operator can verify the
location information for accuracy of dispatch. Different PSAPs support different geographical
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locations and it is important that the 9-1-1 call be routed to the correct PSAP. Sometimes, the calls
are transferred to another PSAP by the 9-1-1 operator based on location jurisdiction. The National

NENA Standard for 9-1-1 Call Processing
Emergency Number Association
(NENA) Standard
that 95% of
9- 16, 2020
NENA-STA-020.1-2020
(combines
56-001,Operating
56-005,Procedure
56,006specifies
and 56-501),
April
1-1 calls should be answered within 20 seconds and 90% within 15 seconds [9]. This response

A –Prank
Call9-1-1
Process
time period is depicted in Exhibit
the Figure 2.1.
calls areDiagram
handled as per local policies. The
9-1-1 operators use foreign language translators to help process foreign language calls. Denial-ofService attacks are handled through call blocking methods. Calls are answered in the order they
are received and are queued until an operator becomes available to answer.

Figure 2.1: NENA Call Answering Standard. Call answering interval is measured from the time
the call arrives at the PSAP until it is answered by a 9-1-1 operator. The NENA standard matches
the National Fire Protection Associate Standard of 90% calls answered in 15 seconds or less and
95% calls answered in 20 seconds or less. (Source: nena.org)
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2.1.2

Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and OpenFlow

In traditional networks, the data and the control planes of the network layer both reside on the
switching device. Software-Defined Networking (SDN) virtualizes the network layer by defining
a logically centralized control plane that resides outside the switching device to manage and program the data plane behavior [28]. This provides flexible flow management and opportunity for
innovation in network management and control services that run on top of the SDN controller. The
software controller can have very complex algorithms to manage network behavior and policies
like access control and firewall. For scalability in large networks, this logically centralized control
plane comprises of multiple controllers that need to coordinate and communicate with each other
to manage the network through a global view of the network.
Each controller manages multiple SDN-capable switches and communicates with its switches
through a Southbound Interface (SBI), currently standardized as OpenFlow [29], developed by
Open Networking Foundation (ONF). Network and traffic management services are programmed
in the SDN application layer that interfaces with the controllers through the Northbound Interface
(NBI). Controller-controller communication is enabled through an East/West Interface, with no
standards defined yet. The East/West Interface can be used to connect a traditional IP network
with an SDN network. It can also be used to facilitate authentication and authorization across
different administrative domains.
The SDN data plane, running at the switches, handles incoming packets by matching them to rules
and performing actions on the packets such as forwarding it to an outgoing port, dropping it, sending it to the controller for processing, or forwarding copies to multiple output ports (multicasting).
The forwarding logic is driven by flow rules in the Flow Table of the network device (SDN-enabled
switch). The rules are configured by the control plane and can be inserted via OpenFlow protocol
into the data plane proactively or reactively based on real-time events like receiving a packet at
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a switch that does not match any rule and the switch inquiring the controller how to handle the
packet, or inserting rules to block certain source addresses identified as malicious by an external
intrusion detection system.

2.1.3

Mininet for SDN Emulation

Mininet is an open-source emulation software that runs on a single Linux kernel and, with a simple
command, creates a realistic virtual network in a few seconds, consisting of various network elements like hosts, switches, links and controller [30]. It can be installed on Ubuntu natively, or it is
typically used by downloading the pre-packaged Mininet VM image and running it on a hypervisor
like VirtualBox, Xen or VMware. When creating a Mininet topology, different parameters can be
used in the network creation command resulting in topologies of various size by using the ‘–topo
flag’ and passing it the parameters for topology type, layers, number of switches, number of hosts,
etc. It is easy to interact with the Mininet network using commands fed into the Mininet Command Line Interface (CLI). Alternatively, the Mininet’s Python API allows us to create networks
with custom topologies by specifying the depth of the network, fanout for the number of switches,
number of hosts, controllers, links between the hosts, etc.; and allows us to run tests on the created
network topology. One can connect to the Mininet hosts using ssh, and run network applications
on the host machine. Packets from one host can be sent to another over a realistic switch or router.
Delay and performance will depend on the link speed, concurrent flows, network congestion, etc.
The switches in Mininet network are OpenFlow virtual switches, are programmable using OpenFlow protocol, and can be ported to real hardware. Thus, Mininet enables development in SDN
and is used extensively for research, testing, and experimenting.
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2.1.4

Distributed Internet Traffic Generator (D-ITG)

Distributed Internet Traffic Generator (D-ITG) is a network traffic generator created by Avallone et
al. that can generate TCP and UDP traffic flows with inter-packet times and packet sizes following
statistical distributions like Poisson, Gamma, Pareto, Exponential and others [31]. It can be used
to measure network performance metrics like delay (one way trip time or round-trip time), jitter,
packet loss, and throughput. Logs related to the traffic flow can be generated and stored on either
the sender or the receiver or on a remote server. Three main commonly used commands from this
tools are used to send and receive traffic and to read the log files: ITGSend, ITGRecv, and ITGDec.
ITGSend can generate traffic flow at the host where it is run with options specifying the type of
flow, duration, destination, protocol, packet size and many more. ITGRecv can be run at the host
acting as the service provider, so for example, running a server or database. ITGRecv spawns new
threads for each new connection request. ITGDec can be run on the sender or receiver, taking as
input the name and path of the log file.

2.2

Related Work in Scaling PSAP operations

This section presents related work in scaling emergency response operations through social media
applications.

2.2.1

Social Media in Disaster Management

During catastrophic disasters with thousands of people impacted such as in Hurricane Katrina of
2005, Haiti Earthquake of 2010, Louisiana flooding in 2016, Texas flooding due to Hurricane Harvey in 2017, the 9-1-1 call centers become inundated with calls and people calling in for help are
unable to reach an operator. With 230 million active social media uses in the United States [12],
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social media has become a prominent communication tool for seeking help, information, situational documentation, and connecting with volunteers. Additionally, social media is being used
by people after disasters to communicate with their loved ones that they are safe [13]. Goolsby
describes how information from various social media sources can be used to create crisis maps that
can be integrated by public safety organizations within their own information maps, and thus help
in organizing collective missions [32]. Grace et al. suggest to have special social media analysts
to aggregate and derive insights from information through social media in context of the 9-1-1
calls being received by the call centers [33]. The work by Gao et al. [5] describes the pros and
cons of using crowdsourcing in relief operations and discusses research challenges like incorrect
or incomplete location information, the need to have both summary data and drill-down capabilities, the issues of scalability with different agencies and user privacy in crowdsourcing information
systems. We attempt to tackle the scalability and real-time requirements of emergency operations
through social media in our proposed framework.
Jahanian et al. studied the use of social media in the context of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma of
2017 and correlated Twitter data with data from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
reports on the availability of cell towers as well as PSAPs [34]. They observed that when 9-1-1
service was impacted, some cell sites were still available, for example Lee county had 34-62%
cellular services but only 5% of PSAPs were available and working with ALI. This shows that
there is potential of leveraging social media via cellular service and reach help when traditional
9-1-1 service is impacted by a disaster. In our proposed work, we have shown the framework of
such an SOS service running on a social media platform like Twitter. Several other bodies of work
focus on analyzing social media posts, but the focus of our work is to explore using social media
as an extension of 9-1-1 call center, and scaling the “online 9-1-1” functionality.
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2.2.2

Evolution of Social Chatbots

Online conversation automation on social media can be achieved through chatbots that use Artificial Intelligence and natural language processing to interact with humans and have conversations.
The work by Sum et al. highlights the evolution of chatbots from Eliza (1966) to Microsoft’s
XioaIce (2014), their limitations and open problems [35]. Early systems conversed based on
scripted responses within a specific domain using pattern matching on textual input. Task completion systems focus on automatic speech recognition to complete tasks in constrained domains
like airline reservation, banking, etc. Recently, we have seen a rise in Intelligent Personal Assistants like Cortana, Alexa, Siri, and Google Assistant that can answer questions like what is the
weather like today, provide proactive prompts for upcoming events and perform tasks like ordering food by authorized integration with other applications. Social chatbots of late have intellectual
quotient (IQ) and emotional quotient (EQ) components, can have a visual agent, can form a bond
with humans through long conversations. This has been made possible through the advances of
natural language processing, computer vision, and multimodal intelligence. For example, Fung et
al. proposed Zara as an empathetic robot [36]. Microsoft’s XiaoIce [37] emulates a 19-year-old female, has visual awareness, and has 180+ skills like poem composition, witty responses on images
and singing in a human-like voice. It has over a 100 million users that have logged on average 23turn long sessions owing to its high perceived EQ and has composed over 12 million poems [38].
All these examples support our proposal of a public safety bot to effectively and quickly get the key
pieces of information from the help seeker regarding the nature and location of their emergency.

2.2.3

Community Engagement in Wide-scale Disasters

Relief from large-scale disasters as well as post-disaster recovery is not possible without the active
involvement and engagement of community volunteers. One of the most successful examples
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of grass-roots volunteer organization was seen during Hurricane Katrina with the birth of Cajun
Navy, which is a volunteer group with boats that were able to multiply the rescue efforts of the first
responders and authorities during 2005 Katrina, 2016 Louisiana Floods, 2017 Hurricane Harvey,
2018 Hurricane Michael, and 2019 Hurricane Barry. They have evolved into a more structured nonprofit organization, Cajun Navy Relief and Rescue, with a website for civilians to register and join
volunteer teams, and get trained and even offers training for volunteer Cajun Navy dispatchers 1 .
For communication of efforts and coordination of dispatch, the Cajun Navy uses Glympse 2 , a
location tracking app, and Zello, a Push-To-Talk app 3 .
Smith et al. looked to answer how mobile technologies are used for communication by volunteer
organizations during catastrophes and what were the challenges, specifically while studying social
media use during Hurricane Harvey [25]. Apart from the volunteers that were performing the
rescue, these efforts needed volunteers to peruse through various social media sites looking for
calls for help as well as people to help compile information on road closures and flooding levels,
etc. to give to the rescue teams. The study highlights a couple of issues with these volunteer
operations: Lack of feedback loops made it hard to track who had already been rescued; lack of a
clear way to prioritize requests made it hard to send help to the more critical cases first (note that
PSAP agents are trained to triage calls); information overload from multiple sources to the rescuers
made it hard for rescuers to keep the important messages separate from the general communication;
Zello public channels that were being used by volunteer teams got overloaded with calls for help
when public found out about the channels; rescuers receiving many messages from their concerned
family members put additional strain on battery-constrained devices. We have tried to address
some of these challenges through our SOS protocol that connects volunteers with dispatchers, has
a feedback loop, prioritizes requests, and sends the requests to the appropriate dispatch or volunteer
1 https://www.cajunnavyrelief.com/
2 https://glympse.com/get-glympse-app/
3 https://zello.com/product/push-to-talk-app/
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unit.
In Chapter 3, we present our scalable communication framework of running a 9-1-1 like service
on a social media platform, particularly using Twitter as an example, and show how officials can
interoperate with other philanthropic organizations for humanitarian rescue and response missions.

2.3

Related Work in Multi SDN Domains

This section presents an overview of the literature on distributed SDN applications, distributed
control plane architectures, and controller communication across SDN domains and highlights
some of the challenges.
In a typical SDN setup (Figure 2.2), each controller manages multiple SDN-capable switches and
communicates with the switches through a Southbound Interface (SBI), currently standardized as
OpenFlow [29], developed by Open Networking Foundation (ONF). Network and traffic management services are programmed in the SDN application layer that interfaces with the controllers
through the Northbound Interface (NBI).
The SDN landscape has focused on localized solutions where enterprise networking administrators are interested in virtualizing the network layer and gaining more agility in order to meet the
traffic demands of their enterprise. However, demand for Software-Defined Wide Area Networking (SD-WAN) is growing. SD-WAN will allow organizations with branch offices spanning the
globe to connect their geographically dispersed data centers more efficiently through increased
automation and intelligent service-delivery across the WAN. According to Omdia’s Data Center
Network Equipment Market Tracker, the SD-WAN revenue grew by 90% in 2019 and is expected
to reach $4.8B in 2024 [39]. Scaling SD-WAN solutions to multiple branches/sites requires better
management of controller-controller communication through an East/West interface. The East20

/West interface can be used to connect a traditional IP network with an SDN network. It can also
be used to facilitate authentication and authorization across different administrative domains. No
clear standards exist for the East/West interface.
Furthermore, SD-WAN applications needing access to datasets distributed over large areas and
potentially owned by multiple institutions are still limited to traditional pre-SDN technologies.
Enabling SDN for these types of SD-WAN-and-beyond applications requires SDN frameworks
capable of handling multi-institution engagements and controller-to-controller setups.
SDN
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Figure 2.2: Multiple controllers form a logically centralized control plane to manage the network
devices centrally.

2.3.1

Distributed SDN Applications

Distributed SDN application designs have mostly focused on network traffic engineering for the
purpose of higher Quality of Service (QoS) provisioning. MonSamp [40] is a QoS-monitoring dis21

tributed SDN application, that samples flows for QoS analysis by installing flows in the flow tables
to send packets of the flows being monitored to an external Collector and Analyzer monitoring
application, as a reaction to changes in link utilization.
Additionally, balancing the load on distributed SDN controllers has also attracted attention, to provide better SDN performance. In [41], the authors present a load-balancing SDN application and
highlight the importance of a consistent network view by showing that load-balancing decisions
suffer when made without considering inconsistencies observed in the global view. In [42], the
authors tackle the load-balancing problem of multiple distributed controllers where each controller
talks with multiple switches. Load-balancing decisions are either made centrally by a coordinating
controller that collects load information from all the controllers, figures out the best course of action and sends back commands to the distributed controllers; or, locally, at each controller by using
the load information received from other controllers. Both these cases incur delay for reaching a
decision.
Although these studies provide ways of addressing load-balancing issues in distributed SDN applications (and hence controllers), they do not address the case of distributed SDN applications over
different SDN domains.

2.3.2

Logically Distributed Control Plane

In a logically centralized control plane, shown in Figure 2.2, the controllers are physically distributed but the decisions are made centrally by a designated root controller that manages devices,
all part of the same domain, so the network administrator has full control of the SDN controllers.
In a logically distributed control plane, we have multiple domains, each managed by its own controller as shown in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Multiple controllers in different SDN domains form a control plane that is both physically and logically distributed.

Logically distributed controllers coordinate the control functions of the control plane with each
other by maintaining a global view of the network. This is accomplished through controllercontroller communication and synchronizing the network view by sharing network state information among all the controllers. For example, in HyperFlow [43], inter-controller communication
occurs through a publish/subscribe model with three network channels: a data channel for publishing local network events, a control channel for discovery and its own channel for receiving
OpenFlow commands. Another method of sharing information among controllers is by means
of distributed constructs like distributed databases or distributed hash tables and then using dis23

tributed locking and consensus algorithms for achieving consistency of state information. For
example, Onix [44] proposed an SQL database for infrequently changing topology and a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) for frequently changing information like link utilization. Scalability
is achieved by partitioning the Network Information Base (NIB) which stores the network state
among controllers, and aggregating the nodes under a controller to present as a single node to the
global network.
Maintaining global state suffers from delay in terms of the time it takes to synchronize network
states across all controller nodes for a consistent network view. Methods have been proposed to
reduce this delay by caching flow rules and distributing them throughout the controllers. Rules
can be updated periodically when link failures occur. Using this strategy, Distributed Rule Store
(DRS) [45] is another architecture for multiple controllers based on Floodlight [46] that demonstrates a reduced time to setup flows as compared with ONOS [47] and Floodlight.
HyperFlow and Onix suffer from synchronization delay to achieve network state information consistency, while our approach does not require a global network state to be maintained as the controller in one institution does not need to know the network topology inside the other institution.
Additionally, the DRS architecture presents performance improvements for reactive applications
but it does not deal with controllers that belong to different domains or institutions.

2.3.3

Challenges with Multiple Controllers

Oktian et al. surveyed and described four design choices in distributed controllers: a) whether a
switch connects to the controller statically or dynamically; b) whether all controllers have global
network state information or only the root layer has the global view; c) how controllers work to
resolve any conflicting or competing rules through consensus algorithms; and d) whether or not
dedicated links are used for managing control traffic among controllers and between switches and
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controllers [48]. The authors then classify existing distributed SDN architectures like DISCO [49],
HyperFlow [43], D-SDN [50], Onix [44], Kandoo [51], and FlowBroker [52] according to these
design choices and discuss their impact on scalability, privacy, robustness and consistency of the
network.
Wibowo et al. survey existing work on multi-domain SDNs [53] and describe challenges of distributed controllers as: a) having a consistent global view of the network state [44, 43]; b) defining
the optimal number and placement of these distributed controllers [54]; and c) synchronization
and coordination of events local to the controller and events occurring globally in the distributed
control plane. Logically centralized but physically distributed controllers like Onix [44] and HyperFlow [43] must share network state with each other and usually employ distributed data stores,
like a distributed file system or distributed hash table. With every change of network state at a local controller, it needs to be synchronized with other controllers. With fully distributed controllers,
such as DISCO [49], ONOS [47], and Kandoo [51], a complete global network state does not need
to be maintained across all controllers and is thus suited for a multi-domain SDN.
In addition to the architecture of the distributed control plane, there is a need to work on the Eastbound/Westbound interface. One such work is the East-West Bridge [55] that connected global research and education networks, but this remains an open research area. The NSF-funded DANCES
project [56] from Hazlewood et al. built a prototype for scheduling network bandwidth for bulk
file transfers through WAN typically required in supercomputing, using OpenFlow v1.3 metering
and Ryu controller to configure QoS through REST API. In contrast to this, we are interested in
a reactive SDN application design for real-time modification to flow rules to enable traffic flows
between two sites.
In Chapter 4, we propose a distributed SDN application that works in SDN domains owned by different organizations to facilitate access to data distributed and managed by different organizations

25

that cannot leave the boundary of the institution due to its institutional policies.
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CHAPTER 3: SCALABILITY IN 9-1-1 OPERATIONS THROUGH
SOCIAL MEDIA AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

We propose a communication protocol and a Public Safety (PS) architecture over social media
platforms like Twitter that allows a person in distress to send SOS messages to the Public Safety
Network and for the response to be routed automatically to the closest dispatch unit or volunteer
registered within the system 1 . The proposed approach could enable communities to learn how
to become part of the extended network of dispatch units by learning the skills necessary and
registering with the Public Safety Network.

3.1

The Smart Public Safety Framework

We propose a Smart Public Safety Framework (SPSF) using social media as a communication
medium in order to:

• Scale the efficiency of PS response and rescue where a purely centralized PS handling approach does not suffice and community engagement is necessary,
• Reduce infrastructure dependency for PS and disaster response communications, and
• Engage communities in helping victims and the PS officials in a safe and reliable manner.

We envision an SPSF web system that can be used by PS officials, Public Safety Network (PSN)
and Public Safety Call Handlers to track and view requests from end users automatically sourced
through social media streams; analyze and triage requests; track and view volunteers’ skills and
1 Prior

versions of the work presented in this chapter have been published in [57, 58] c [2019] IEEE.
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Figure 3.1: Smart Public Safety Framework (SPSF)

training; assign requests to dispatch teams; and more. We will use the term Requester to refer to
the person sending an SOS message via any of the social media platforms. We will use PS officials,
PSN and PS Call Handlers interchangeably to refer to the infrastructure or people who respond to
victims or emergencies. The PSN includes a) PS Call Handlers who respond to distress signals
and b) Dispatch Units or Response Teams that accept the job and rush to the emergency locations.
Dispatch Units are comprised of both officials of Police, Emergency Medical Service and Fire
Department as well as volunteers from the community registered with the SPSF system. This
framework could also have a smartphone app that volunteers can use to easily check in to the SPSF
web system with location updates, add their latest relevant skills (e.g. bilingual), certifications (e.g.
CPR, CFR-D) and training (e.g., lifeguard, mountain rescue, first aid), and view any feedback and
comments from other PS officials or requesters.
Our proposed SPSF system architecture, shown in Figure 3.1, includes the following key components:
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3.1.1

Pubic Safety Bot

The primary purpose of the Public Safety Bot (PSB) is to ingest social media streams in real-time,
monitor for distress signals and alert the PS Call Handler. This would be accomplished by tracking
an agreed-upon hashtag, e.g., #SOS that has been communicated to the public. There are many
tools available to track messages and conversations around hashtags (e.g., Hootsuite) and each
social media platform also has its own API for ingesting streams (e.g., Twitter Streaming API

2

or via an authorized reseller like Gnip for Twitter 3 ). If the request includes the emergency type,
the PSB will flag it for the Handler. The PSB engages with the Requester to confirm the flagged
emergency or present enumerated options to Requester for a simple numeric selection to determine
the cause of this request. The PSB can also be configured to initiate a series of predefined questions
as per PS Call Handling procedure to save time for the handler if they are busy with another
request. The PSB can work with an translator service like Google Cloud Translation API

4

or

Amazon Translate 5 to overcome language barriers between non-English speakers and emergency
call handlers. In addition to being scalable and real-time, these automated techniques allow for
greater accessibility, a clear advantage of using a social media based framework, as traditional
9-1-1 service has to rely on partnerships with other agencies that provide language interpreters.

3.1.2

Victim Triangulation

Accurate victim or emergency location is essential for any successful rescue operation. In the bestcase scenario, a single, geo-tagged tweet from a victim that includes either an emergency code (if
2 https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/filter-realtime/overview
3 https://support.gnip.com/sources/twitter/overview.html
4 https://cloud.google.com/translate
5 https://aws.amazon.com/translate/

29

the public is familiar with emergency codes) or a picture of the emergency may be sufficient for
the dispatcher to quickly assess the situation and send help. However, in reality, less than 3% of
tweets are geo-tagged [59]. For the first responders to reach the distress signal origin, there is a
need to triangulate the messages’ location.
In the case of traditional 9-1-1 service, when a victim dials 9-1-1 from a landline, the Public Safety
Answering Point (PSAP) is able to send first responders to the address registered with the landline
number. When you dial from a cell phone, the call reaches the closest PSAP, but the mobile phones
are not registered with specific addresses. However, the cell towers receiving the signal from the
victim’s mobile phone can triangulate the victim’s location, and provide it to the PSAP agent. In
most cases, the PSAP agent would still confirm the location of the victim or emergency. In the
proposed online SOS service, pinpointing the requester’s location is even more difficult as most
users do not enable geo-tagging.
Aside from the obvious method of the PSAP asking the distressed caller directly about their address, researchers at Penn State propose social triangulation [60] where, by compiling which organizations and people one follows and looking solely at local organizations, they can determine
what communities or localities a person belongs to. Another method is to analyze users’ content and search for keywords, for example, some IBM researchers developed an algorithm using
statistical and heuristic classifiers to predict the location of a Twitter user by analyzing the tweet
content [61]. Although social triangulation can be helpful for public safety officials to send tailored
and targeted messages to people based on their memberships to specific communities, this method
may not work for pinpointing the location of a specific user in real-time during an emergency. Similarly, the content analysis method does not reach the granularity of location identification needed
for rescue and response operations.
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3.1.3

Triaging Social Media SOS Messages

A drawback of using social media for SOS is that social media messages can be anonymous and
it will be necessary to have AI techniques that can effectively filter out fake online SOS calls. Additionally, such triaging can help with overloading issues in the legacy 9-1-1 call service as most
9-1-1 call centers are manned by a limited number of PSAP agents. These agents have to prioritize calls as they receive them while minimizing the wait time of callers in order to process the
most important calls first. The proposed PSB can ask the questions necessary to triage the request,
discard fake ones, and flag requests with life-threatening emergencies. Today’s social chatbots
can have an engaging conversation with the user and gain the user’s trust through empathetic exchange [35]. Studies show that machine learning algorithms have the potential to triage patients
in the emergency department [62] and in some cases can be better at triaging decisions than humans [63]. For example, the AI tool Corti can assist an emergency call-taker to identify if the
caller is having a cardiac arrest in 93% cases (versus 73% by a human dispatcher) by recognizing
patterns in breathing, tone of voice and breaks between words, etc [64]. Not only was it observed
to be more accurate, but it also made the detection faster than human dispatchers by 30 seconds.
Each second counts as every minute after a cardiac arrest without cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(CPR) reduces chances of survival by 7 − 10%, according to the American Heart Association [65].
Kang et al. developed and validated an AI algorithm based on deep learning that was able to triage
and predict critical care cases in prehospital EMS better than traditional triage tools such as the
Emergency Severity Index (ESI) [66].
Traditional 9-1-1 service breaks down during large scale disasters, where PSAP is inundated with
phone calls and some people cannot even get through. Augmenting the traditional network with
a social media based SOS service should help alleviate the burden in disaster cases, but it may
just as easily exacerbate the issue. By making it easy for people to send photos and videos with
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their SOS messages, the amount of traffic generated during a big disaster may end up affecting
network availability and response time. This could be handled by using a mix of Internet-based
social networks and device-to-device networks to extend connectivity by sharing device services
like messaging and data [67].

3.1.4

Queue Processing and Matchmaking

This module is responsible for managing priority queues for incoming requests that have already
been flagged with the emergency type. It automatically processes the incoming requests and adds
them to their relevant queues i.e., fire, police, and medical. Each emergency queue can itself be
prioritized and all queues can be processed in parallel as response teams are generally separate for
these emergency types. Note that this is an advantage to manned PSAPs as calls are processed in
the order they are received, there is no way to know that a high-emergency call is in the wait queue
while a low-emergency call is being handled.
Resolution of PS response resource allocations to requests will need to be performed dynamically.
Further, since response teams may be composed of community participants, the requesters may
need to be consulted prior to making allocations of dispatch units and response teams to a particular
request. One approach could be to allow the Requester to view ratings and reviews of dispatch
units and choose who they would like to receive help from, if time permits. The app would query
its database of volunteers/officials and find available units that are close-by and have completed
similar requests in the past along with their user ratings for past requests.
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3.1.5

Volunteer Management

Let us assume that volunteers would occasionally like to help out the PS response teams by offering their services, either in non-emergency PS requests or in high-emergency PS situations to
augment the limited task force of the PS teams. We expect the volunteers to have skills and training needed to successfully accomplish requests assigned to them. The assumption is that either the
volunteers have prior experience, e.g., as a firefighter, lifeguard, etc., or they will be offered some
sort of training when they join the PS volunteer network to donate their time for improving public
safety. Volunteers must be willing to share their location when they check-in to the SPSF system;
Figure 3.2 shows the online status of Dispatch Units and volunteers and last activity time. We
also propose a Volunteer Management module in the SPSF system where PS officials can view all
volunteer activities, ratings/feedback received, time logged, training acquired, as well as feedback
from other PS officials who may have worked with them on a job as shown in Figure 3.3.

3.1.6

Community Credibility

There are many ways of building credibility in service-seeking platforms like Home Advisor 6 and
Stack Overflow

7

where the work or answer-seeker posts a request, it gets answered by multiple

people and a job professional or final answer is selected. In the SPSF framework, following an
appropriate time after an incident has been handled, the PS volunteer/official will also be able to
receive feedback from the Requester. Requester can provide quantitative feedback, in the form
of a 0-5 star rating or qualitative feedback in the form of comments back to the SPSF system.
Comments can be private or public, with private comments only viewable within the SPSF system
and public comments displayed as reviews on the official’s/volunteer’s public profile. In addition to
6 https://www.homeadvisor.com/
7 https://stackoverflow.com/
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Figure 3.2: Dashboard for Public Safety: Home Page

ratings and reviews, the PS volunteer/official will be able to receive endorsements from their peers
for the skills they have based on any work they have done before or after joining the SPSF. All
this data essentially builds credibility of volunteers and is also fed into the matchmaking process
as described in Section 3.1.4 to find the most suitable skilled response team for a request, or to
allow the Requester to make a selection of the volunteer/official they would like to work with as
they will be able to see public reviews from past Requesters on services provided. The question
is, can we build enough credibility through this framework to allow public to trust strangers with
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Figure 3.3: Dashboard for Public Safety: Volunteer Management

their lives during times of disasters?

3.2

Twitter-based SOS

In terms of communications, SPSF will allow a victim to conveniently contact PSN via social
media instead of just relying on the traditional 9-1-1 call service. A high-level description of SPSF
communication protocol between victims and PS Call Handlers is as follows:

1. PSB monitors channel for distress messages;
2. Requester posts an SOS message on channel; content may also include voice, picture, and/or
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video;
3. Translator AI auto-detects the language, interprets and translates the messages between the
PSB and Requester;
4. PS Call Handler/PSB asks about the nature of the emergency (as a simple selection list) or
confirms what can be determined from the content;
5. Requester responds with emergency details, e.g., fire, chemical hazard, accident, intruder, or
shooting;
6. PS Call Handler/PSB checks if geo-tags are available, and if not, requests exact location of
the Requester;
7. If requested, Requester provides location and other information requested by PS Call Handler/PSB;
8. Triaging AI automatically categorizes and prioritizes requests if deemed legitimate;
9. Match-making AI determines most apt Dispatch Unit and sends emergency code and location
information;
10. Dispatch Unit accepts the task and provides an Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA);
11. PS Call Handler/PSB assures Requester that help is on the way and provides ETA when
available;
12. Dispatch Unit provides updates via SPSF system to the PSN to quickly disperse information;
13. Dispatch Unit executes Incident Action Plan;
14. Dispatch Unit checks out;
15. Requester has opportunity to provide feedback later.
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3.2.1

Twitter-Based 9-1-1 Call Protocol

We specifically focus on Twitter, and propose to use Twitter for Business for the Public Safety (PS)
officials. The Direct Messages (DMs) feature in Twitter can be used to send a message privately
to a particular user or business, if enabled by the account owner. This allows an affected person to
discreetly send an SOS message to the Public Safety team. The DM feature has evolved over the
years and now allows anyone to send DMs to a business without the need to follow the business.
The Twitter-based SPSF communication protocol between an SOS requester, PS Call Handlers and
Dispatch Units within the SPSF system is depicted in Figure 3.4.

Victim

PS Call Handler/Bot
2. #SOS
4. What's the emergency?
5. Fire/medical/police
6. Address?
(if no geo-tagging)
7a. Location
7b. Confirmation

SPSF Web
System

Dispatch Unit

1. Monitor #SOS channel
3. Translator AI
automatically detects
language and responds

8,9. SPSF request triaging
and match-making to
locate closest DU

0. Check in
Location
updates
Location
updates
Location
updates
Location
updates

9. Dispatch request
10. Accept; ETA
11. Enroute; ETA

12. Arrived
13. Follow Incident
Action Plan
14. Check out

15a. Feedback request
15b. Feedback

Figure 3.4: SPSF’s protocol for SOS message exchange via Twitter
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3.3

Delay Analysis

A key question is whether or not the Twitter-based SOS protocol will incur shorter delay in responding and rescuing victims compared to the traditional 9-1-1 service. In Figure 3.5, t1 refers to
the time it takes for the victim to send an SOS tweet to the SPSF channel, t2 refers to the streaming
time from Twitter servers to the SPSF web system for analysis and action, delay t3 denotes the
communication between PSB and victim to determine location and the nature of emergency and t4
represents the time for triaging incoming requests. The SPSF system makes the determination of
which dispatch unit or volunteer to dispatch based on proximity of the available units, the type of
emergency and the current queue. The delay t5 is the amount of time it takes for the SPSF system
to contact a suitable dispatch unit or volunteer and receive confirmation from them when they have
accepted the assignment. If this request is not accepted or no response is received after a certain
time, then the SPSF system would contact the next best available dispatch unit or volunteer. Sometimes, the information received from the victim is not sufficient to make a determination of the
issue or automatically assign a dispatch unit. Let’s assume t50 to be the delay when a PS agent has
to step in to handle the situation and respond to the victim while locating the appropriate dispatch
unit. Let t6 denote the travel time for dispatch/volunteer unit to reach the victim. Total end-to-end
worst-case delay will be tmax = ∑6i=0 ti + t50 .
In the traditional 9-1-1 scenario, we assume the victim will call 9-1-1 using their cellphone (80%
9-1-1 calls come through wireless endpoints [14]). Let d1 be the time it takes the victim to dial the
number and d2 be the time it takes the PSAP agent to answer the call. This depends on the number
of agents, the current calls being answered, and the number of incoming calls. It takes the PSAP
agent d3 time to gather information about the nature and location of the emergency from the victim.
Let d4 be the time it takes the PSAP agent to triage the situation and find a dispatch unit that has
the necessary capabilities to handle the emergency and is the closest to the victim’s location. Let

38

PSAP Agent
d1+d2+d3

d4

d5
t4

User Device
t1
Twitter
Servers

Cellular
Network
t3

t'5

Radio
Network
SPSF Web
System

t5
t2

Internet
t6

d6

Police, EMS, Fire
Dispatch Units and
Volunteers

Figure 3.5: SPSF vs. traditional 9-1-1, delay in various communication segments

d5 be the time it takes for a dispatch unit to be assigned. The dispatch unit then reaches the victim
in time d6 . Total end-to-end delay in the traditional 9-1-1 scenario will be d = ∑6j=0 d j .
Response time guidelines from the National Fire Protection Association Standard 1710 require a
turnout time of 4 minutes or less for the first engine and 8 minutes or less for full deployment for
90% of incidents [68]. We can also assume that the time it takes for the victim to dial 9-1-1 or
text SOS is the same, i.e., t1 ≈ d1 . The SPSF system has built-in automation for “answering an
SOS call” via a bot, and can handle an SOS tweet immediately irrespective of how many PSAP
agents are staffed at the PSAP or how many other calls are being serviced at the same time. The
Twitter stream being received from the Twitter server at the SPSF system is near real-time, so we
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can assume t2 ≈ 0. Yet, when there are large number of callers, the call-wait time for a PSAP agent
in the traditional 9-1-1 service d2 will grow large [10]. Thus, t2 << d2 when the number of callers
is large.
Another key difference between traditional 9-1-1 and SPSF lies in the performance of AI-based bot
in handling the SOS request. The time it takes for the trained PSB to ask questions of the victim
as compared to the PSAP agent can be assumed to be similar. So, we can assume t3 ≈ d3 . The
time for SPSF AI to triage the situation successfully (i.e., with strong confidence) and locate an
appropriate dispatch unit (t4 +t5 ) is less than the time it takes an agent d4 . Let ρ be the probability
that SPSF’s Triaging AI is successful in triaging with a strong enough confidence, then a human
PSAP agent will have to step in 1 − ρ times. We can assume that the time for PSAP agent to locate
a dispatch unit is comparable in both cases, i.e., d5 = t50 . Lastly, the travel time for the dispatch
unit to reach the victim’s location is the same in both cases d6 = t6 . Based on this, the average
delay for SPSF can be written as tavg = ρ(tmax − t50 ) + (1 − ρ)tmax = tmax − ρt50 . Thus, as long as ρ
is positive, it holds that tavg < tmax ≤ d. Improvements in AI will increase ρ. As ρ → 1, the delay
performance of SPSF will improve too. The efficacy of this AI-based approach depends on the
naturalness of the chatbot [69], accuracy of the AI-based triaging [63], and potential in the medical
and emergency response fields [70, 64, 66]. Some of these challenges are highlighted in the next
section.

3.4

The Need for Effective Triaging

Rapid patient assessment and triage can prove extremely useful to help prioritize cases and direct
patients to the right resources faster, as resources in the emergency room (ER) are limited specifically if there is a sudden influx of cases. In emergency settings, AI has found use in areas of
triage, radiology and Natural Language Processing (NLP) to infer diagnoses from ER notes as dis40

cussed in the American Journal of Emergency Medicine letter [62]. Currently, ERs use a five-level
triage method called Emergency Severity Index (ESI) to assign priority to patients and research
has shown that ML is more accurate than ESI [63] to predict patients who would be in acute condition requiring a procedure. In emergency radiology, AI algorithms have been able to identify
fractures similar to an experienced orthopedic surgeon [71]. NLP models have been developed to
identify diagnoses through notes soon following the visit to the ER, for example for evaluating
acute appendicitis [72], and ML-based sepsis detection [73].
However, this use of AI is specific to ER, while during wide-scale disasters, we need triaging at
the 9-1-1 call centers that often do not have trained medical professionals stratifying patients and
this is one of the components of our proposed framework. Additionally, the triaging at a 9-1-1 call
extends beyond medical emergencies as it can include criminal activity, shootings, fires, etc. which
indeed may all have a medical emergency as part of the situation.

3.5

Security, Privacy and Compliance to Regulations and Policies

All communication between the victim and the Public Safety Call Handler as well as between the
victim and dispatch or volunteer units needs to be over secure private channels. To that end, Twitter
is currently testing encryption for their Direct Messages [74] and when available, this feature would
be key for the proposed framework. Geo-tagging also has its own privacy concerns but location
information is needed for rescue, whether provided directly by the user or through geo-tagging
or through some means of triangulation. Sometimes the person reporting the emergency may not
wish for their identity to be revealed. More work needs to be done to assess the viability of social
media for such anonymous reporters.
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3.6

The Federal Communications Commission’s Guidance on Dispatchable Location

We also raise the importance of detecting the victim’s location for a successful rescue and response
operation, especially in the case of non-traditional framework.
According to the FCC, for effective 9-1-1 call routing to the appropriate PSAP, the location information needs to be calculated within five seconds with a high accuracy, while GPS technologies
may take up to 30 seconds [75]. FCC estimates that 10,000 lives could be saved annually if dispatchers could locate the callers one minute earlier [75]. This is especially a challenge in calls
made using wireless devices where they may get routed to the PSAP closest to the cell tower of the
mobile device. FCC requires cellphone carriers to allow callers to be located within 50 meters in
80% of the calls by 2021 [76]. In 2018, Google and Apple launched Emergency Location Service
(ELS) in the US [77, 78] to send caller location to RapidSOS Clearinghouse 8 which can then be
pulled by the PSAP into their computer-aided dispatching system. A pilot study of Android ELS
shows that ELS information was received 25-30 seconds faster through the RapidSOS Clearinghouse information than ALI Phase 2 Next Generation 9-1-1, and the location uncertainty radius
was 50 meters or less for 76% of the calls versus Phase 2 uncertainly radius of 150 meters [79].
ELS is more accurate than using cell tower radiolocation as it uses Wi-Fi, GPS and cell tower
data, can find the location of the device indoors and outdoors, and is faster than traditional use of
location data through ALI [77].
In 2019, two new federal laws were adopted by the Federal Communications Commission to make
9-1-1 calling more effective: Kari’s Law and Section 506 of RAY BAUM’s Act [80] that apply to
all multi-line telephone systems sold or installed after February 16, 2020. Kari’s Law directs that
all MLTS such as those used in office buildings, campuses, hotels, etc. should allow for dialing
8 https://www.zo.ai/
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9-1-1 without any preceding ‘9’. It also requires that building managers be notified so they can
assist first responders gain the appropriate building, floor, and office accesses. Additionally RAY
BAUM’s Act requires that dispatchable location be sent to the PSAPs for 9-1-1 calls made from
fixed telephony, Interconnected VoIP, Internet-based Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS)
and mobile text service; and should include a validated address, suite, apartment number, or floor
number as may be necessary in the case of a huge office building that may have only one street
address, to enable first responders to quickly locate the caller.
Any solution analogous to 9-1-1 using means other than those covered by Kari’s Law and RAY
BAUM’s act should consider how to meet the dispatchable location requirements, and be able
to triangulate the victim within five seconds accurate within 50 meters of the call/request as per
FCC’s requirements.
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CHAPTER 4: USING DISTRIBUTED, REACTIVE SDN FOR
REAL-TIME, SCALABLE MULTI-AGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

We introduce a distributed, reactive SDN framework for real-time traffic path establishing to enable
multi-agency data sharing; formulate the overhead of this reactive framework when compared to
the proactive case; present a simplified analytical model to capture the effect of flow table size and
flow rule expiration timer on this delay; and present a simplified model that expresses average flow
table size with respect to the expiration timer1 .

4.1

SDN-based Inter-agency Communication Framework

We consider Floodlight [46], a Java-based controller developed by Big Switch Networks for developing our distributed, reactive SDN application. Aside from the core functions of the controller, the
Floodlight controller offers functions implemented as modules that interact with the core controller
through Java APIs. We have developed a custom module that can promptly respond to network
events due to its interface with the core controller. The controller manages traffic by managing the
flow tables of the switches. Flow tables consist of flow rules; each rule consisting of header fields
for packet matching, action fields for forwarding instructions, and counters for statistics. Proactive
application has these flow rules pre-configured because the information on network behavior is
known a priori. Reactive application can insert flow rules into the switch flow tables as a response
(reaction) to network events. When a packet arrives at a switch, the switch matches the packet with
the header fields in the flow entries and if a match is found, the switch performs the specific actions
in the flow entry. When several matches are found, the rule with the highest priority applies. If a
match is not found, the switch asks the controller for instruction by sending it a Packet In message.
1A

prior version of the work presented in this chapter has been published in [81] c [2019] IEEE.
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Figure 4.1: Reactive, distributed SDN application architecture for multi-agency data access with
a RAL server. Flow rules are dynamically installed when hosts registered with the RAL server
initiate communication.

A reactive SDN application can register an event listener with the controller to listen in for these
Packet In messages and can inspect the headers of the packet to determine how to handle the packet
and what flow rules to install to handle subsequent such packets.

4.1.1

Multi-agency SDN Architecture

The proposed architecture for data access between two SDN domains A and B is presented in
Figure 4.1. In our approach, we will create a Registered Access List (RAL) server to maintain
the list of organizations participating in this multi-institution data access framework. Our reactive
SDN application running on the controller will intercept packets sent to the controller and talk
to the RAL server to determine if access to the remote domain’s resource should be granted or
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denied. Flow rules will be jointly installed into the edge switches controlled by the controllers at
both domains to handle this inter-domain traffic. Assume there is a server in domain B that has a
resource that a client in domain A wants to access. The sequence of steps that occur to allow traffic
from A to B is as follows:

1. Client at host h1 requests the resource at server h2 by sending a packet towards h2.
2. The switch in A’s network detects a new traffic flow and sends this unmatched packet to the
SDN controller.
3. The reactive SDN module running on the controller intercepts the Packet In message to
handle this packet.
4. The SDN application extracts source and destination from packet header, and queries the
RAL server to determine if the source and destination are registered.
5. Assume that the source and destination are participants in the data access framework, so
RAL server responds that both source and destination are registered.
6. If so, the SDN application composes OpenFlow’s FlowMod messages to allow traffic from
the host h1 in domain A to h2 in domain B and sends to the controller.
7. The controller then instructs the switch to install the respective flows in its flow table.
8. The packet is then forwarded as normal and reaches the switch at domain B.
9. When the traffic is received by the switch in domain B, it does not find a match in its flow
table and forwards the packet to the controller in domain B.
10. Domain B’s controller invokes the packet handler of the reactive SDN application listening
for message events.
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11. The SDN application extracts the source and destination from the packet header, connects
with the RAL server to check if source and destination are registered.
12. Assume that the RAL server responds positively.
13. The SDN application then follows its packet handling logic to allow this flow.
14. The SDN controller instructs the switch to install flow rules to allow traffic from source to
destination.
15. The request is forwarded as normal to the output port of the switch that is linked to host h2.
16. Host h2 responds to the request, and sends the response packets to the switch at domain B.
17. The resulting packets are sent as a response to domain A’s switch which forwards the response to host h1.

During this process, if the RAL server responds negatively to the queries from the controllers in
domains A and B, the requested flow will not be allowed. This blocking can be due to various
reasons including policy differences in the domains A and B. It is important to note that both the
controllers query the RAL server separately mainly because this allows the domains to possibly
implement their dynamic policies during this querying steps.

4.1.2

Reactive SDN Components

Key SDN components of the proposed framework are:

• Multiple physically distributed Floodlight controllers managing different SDN domains,
each governed by its own institutional policies for data egress.
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• A remote Registered Access List (RAL) server that maintains the list of registered agencies
intending to participate in the multi-institution data access framework. Agencies can register
themselves or un-register themselves at any time. Furthermore, the agencies can selectively
register a subset of their resources with the server depending on their policy choices. The
RAL server is implemented as a multi-threaded Java server application to handle queries
from multiple SDN controllers.
• A reactive SDN application running on the controllers. The application has a packet handler
to handle Packet In messages and a RAL client for establishing web socket connections to
the RAL server for querying.
• OpenFlow as the SouthBound Interface for communicating with the SDN infrastructure layer
composed of switches and data plane functions. Currently, we have implemented our algorithm to support OpenFlow v1.0 [29] switches and use the OpenFlowJ-Loxigen library [82]
for creating OpenFlow messages.

If the source and destination are both members of RAL, three rules are installed as shown in
Figure 4.2. Assuming TCP traffic, the first rule allows TCP traffic from source to destination.
Because TCP is bidirectional, the second rule allows TCP traffic from destination to source. A
third rule will be installed to drop all other TCP traffic. The key thing to note here is that the
priority of Rule 3 is very low. Rules 1 and 2 are installed at the default priority of 32,768. If
either source or destination or both are not registered with RAL, Rule 4 is installed which instructs
the switch to drop the traffic from that source to that destination. The algorithm for the proof of
concept for TCP traffic allowing only the intended flow and rejecting all others is summarized in
Algorithm 1.
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Figure 4.2: Logic flow between RAL server, RAL client and SDN packet handler.

4.2

Delay Analysis for Real-time Response

In this section, we analyze the expected processing delay of flows in the proposed reactive SDN
application scenario. When a new flow arrives at the switch, the switch inspects the packet header
and performs a look-up in the flow table to find matching flow rule(s) based on header fields like
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Result: OpenFlow messages written to switch
while packet_in message do
if packet is IPv4 and protocol is TCP then
source = payload.getSourceAddress();
destination = payload.getDestinationAddress();
destinationPort = tcp.getDestinationPort();
if either source or destination are not in RAL then
Add Rule 4 with Match:(src=source, dest=destination, ip_protocol=TCP,
tcp_destination_port=destinationPort), actions=drop, priority=10;
else
Add Rule 1 with Match:(src=source, dest=destination, ip_protocol=TCP,
tcp_destination_port=destinationPort), priority=default, actions=NORMAL;
Add Rule 2 with Match:(src=destination, dest=source, ip_protocol=TCP,
tcp_source_port=destinationPort), priority=default, actions=NORMAL;
Add Rule 3 with Match:(src=source, dest=destination, ip_protocol=TCP,
tcp_destination_port=destinationPort), priority=2, actions=drop;
end
else
return Command.CONTINUE;
end
end
return Command.CONTINUE;//allow processing by other handlers

Algorithm 1: SDN reactive application packet handler
IP Protocol, IP Source, IP Destination, and Ingress Port. Flow rules when matched, guide the
switch on what action to take on the packet, for example, forward to a specific port, drop the
packet, or flood to all ports. Packet headers are matched to flow rules in the order of priority of
the installed rules. The time it takes to do a search and match operation in the flow table depends
upon the hardware, which for an OpenFlow switch is typically implemented by leveraging Ternary
Content Addressable Memory (TCAM), where each header field is searched in parallel in one
clock cycle, resulting in look-up time in O(1). This look-up delay of TCAM is typically in the
order of nanoseconds. TCAMs have a limited size with typical switch chipsets storing about 2K
flow entries [83] while typical data traffic in a data center can be in the order of 10,000 new flows
per second [84]. Due to limited size, flow table occupancy is managed by installing flow rules with
an expiration timeout, known as idle timeout set by the controller. This counter decays over time if
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no incoming flow is matched to this entry, until it finally reaches zero and results in the flow entry
being evicted from the flow table due to being idle.

4.2.1

Probability of Hit

Let phit be the probability that a new flow arriving at the switch is matched with an installed flow
entry and processed immediately, without any communication to the controller. This match occurs
at line rate in TCAM hardware. On the other hand, if there is no flow table entry for the new flow
in the current flow table with probability 1 − phit , additional communication between switch and
controller occurs to install a new flow entry for this new flow.
In order to find the probability of having a flow hit, phit , we need to consider multiple parameters
at the same time, namely, the flow entry expiration timer τ (in seconds), the packet arrival rate λ
(in packets per second) assuming Poisson flows, and the capacity of the flow table σ (in flows). By
Little’s theorem, on average there will be λ τN flows arriving in a time interval of τ, where N is
the total different number of flows possible. However, if the flow table size is not sufficiently large
to hold all these flows, there will be at most σ flows existing in the flow table. Thus, when a new
flow arrives, the probability of hit will be proportional to min{λ τN, σ }/N.
On the other hand, it is possible that even though there is room in flow table for all arrivals, the old
table entry may have expired for the newly arriving flow. Thus, we need to consider this possibility.
Since the packet arrival rate of a flow is λ , the probability that another packet with same flow id
will arrive before the flow rule timer expires (so, the probability of hit in this case) becomes the
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the Exponential distribution by time τ:
phit = 1 − e−λ τ .
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Figure 4.3: Average flow hit ratio for different flow expiration timer (τ) values and flow rates (λ ),
when N=1,000 and σ =200, where N is the total different number of flows possible, and σ is the
flow table size.

Overall, the flow hit probability can be calculated by


σ
phit = min λ τ, , 1 − e−λ τ
σ N

= min
, 1 − e−λ τ .
N

(4.1)
(4.2)

Note that the first term in (4.1) will always be larger than the third term in (4.1) when λ τ > 0,
hence removed from the formula.
We have calculated phit in several scenarios using (4.1) as shown in Figure 4.3. We have also
run simulations to compare with the theoretical results. To this end, we developed a Java based
simulation environment and generated flows with inter-packet arrival rate Exponentially distributed
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with rate λ , to an SDN flow table of size σ . Once a new flow arrives and finds an existing entry in
the flow table from previous arrival (as the timer of previous entry has not expired yet) it matches
with the entry and a hit happens. Otherwise, a new entry is added by the controller to the flow
table, with a higher processing delay. We have used least recently used (LRU) drop policy in the
flow table. That is, if a new flow arrives and the flow table is full already, the addition of the new
flow’s entry to the flow table causes the least recently used flow entry to be dropped. We ran each
scenario for 10,000 seconds to get a stable behavior. The simulation results in Figure 4.3 show that
average flow hit ratio for each scenario perfectly matches with analytical results, confirming the
analytical model. The psuedocode of some of the key functions of this simulation is shared below
from Algorithm 2 to Algorithm 7.
Input : λ , rate parameter for Exponential packet inter-arrival time; σ , flow table size; τ, flow
rule idle expiration timer; N, number of flows
Output: Generates Average Hit Ratio of simulation.
begin
createTimeQueue()
while timeQueue.size() > 0 and currentTime < simulationTime do
totalFlowProcessed ← totalFlowProcessed + 1
currentFlow ← getFirstElementFromTimeQueue()
currentTime ← currentFlow.getArrivalTime()
deleteExpiredFlows()
removeFromTimeQueue(currentFlow)
insertToFlowTable(currentFlow)
hitRatio ← (hits) ∗ 1.0/(hits + misses)
avgFlowTableSize ← avgFlowTableSize + f lowTable.getSize()
avgFlowTableSize ← avgFlowTableSize/(hits + misses)
newFlow ← createNewFlow()
insertToTimeQueue(newFlow)
totalFlowsCreated ← totalFlowsCreated + 1
end
end
Algorithm 2: runFlowArrival
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Result: Generates a timeQueue with flow packets having Exponentially distributed
inter-arrival times
begin
timeQueue ← 0
for i ← 1 to totalPossibleFlowCount do
nextArrivalTime ← getNextArrivalTime()
newFlow ← createFlow(id = i, arrivalTime = nextArrivalTime)
insertToTimeQueue(newFlow)
totalFlowsCreated ← totalFlowsCreated + 1
end
end
Algorithm 3: createTimeQueue

Result: Deletes all the flows from the flowTable whose idle time has past.
begin
while f lowTable.getSize() > 0 do
f low ← getFlowTableFirstElement()
if currentTime − f low.getArrivalTime() > f lowRuleExpirationTimer then
removeFlowTableFirstElement()
else
break
end
end
end
Algorithm 4: deleteExpiredFlows

Input : λ , rate parameter for Exponential packet inter-arrival time
Output: A random number based on Exponential distribution of rate λ
begin
// Generate a uniformly-distributed random value between 0 and 1.
u ← getRandomNumber(0, 1)
return −loge (1 − u)/(λ )
end
Algorithm 5: getNextArrivalTime
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Input : flow, f
Output: Inserts given flow into timeQueue.
begin
for i ∈ timeQueue do
if timeQueue.getElementAt(i).getArrivalTime() > f .getArrivalTime() then
putHere ← i
break
end
end
timeQueue.putElementAt(element = f , position = putHere)
end
Algorithm 6: insertToTimeQueue

Input : flow, f ; sigma, σ
Output: Inserts given flow to f lowTable.
begin
// check if it is there already
f ound ← false
for i ← 0 to f lowTable.getSize() do
if f lowTable.getElementAt(i).getId() = f .getId() then
f ound ← true
hits ← hits + 1
break
end
end
// if not there, add it, remove the oldest one if more than sigma
if f ound = false then
misses ← misses + 1
f lowTable.insertElementAtEnd( f )
if f lowTable.getSize() >= σ then
removeFlowTableFirstElement()
end
end
end
Algorithm 7: insertToFlowTable
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4.2.2

Reactive SDN Overhead

Referring to Figure 4.1 of the proposed architecture with two agencies A and B, with B wishing to
provide access to a resource within its network to agency A, we have the following time delays:
Let the delay tARAL be the time for a message exchanged between agency A’s SDN application
and the RAL server; considering that the RAL server may not be running at the same location as
agency A. Assume that the SDN application runs on the same host as the SDN controller. Then,
the time delay for a message between the SDN application and the SDN controller in agency A’s
network is tAcap . Let tA pki refer to the time for the switch to generate a Packet In message and send
it to the controller, tA f md refer to the time for a FlowMod message sent between the SDN controller
and the switch, tAlkp be the lookup time in the flow table for finding a flow-rule match, tA f in be the
flow installation time, and tAhst denote the time for message sent between the host and the switch in
agency A. Similarly, for agency B, we have the following corresponding time delays, which may
be different from agency A as B’s network is owned and managed by a different entity: tBRAL , tBcap ,
tB pki , tB f md , tBlkp , tB f in and tBhst . Agency B also has a resource rendering time of tBrsc , which is the
time it takes for the host machine (server) in agency B to fetch and process the data requested by
the host (client) in agency A. Finally, let tnet be the propagation delay of communicating packets
between the edge switch of agency A and the edge switch of agency B over the Internet.

4.2.2.1

Proactive Scenario

In the proactive scenario (Figure 4.4), rules are pre-installed by the network admin into the flow
tables. For the purpose of this analysis, we consider the flow entries in the proactive application to
be permanent where both the idle timeout and the hard timeout are set to 0. If we assume the flow
tables to be sufficiently large to allow pre-population of all flow rules required, then, the end-to-end
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Figure 4.4: Proactive SDN application setup, where flow rules are proactively pushed and installed
from the controller to the switches when the network instantiates.

data access delay from the host machine in agency A, h1, to the data repository behind the host
machine in agency B, h2, is:

tP = tAlkp + tBlkp + n(tAhst + tBhst + tnet + tBrsc )
where n ≥ 2 is the number of times communication exchange between A and B occurs. For simplification, assume that network setup is the same at both agencies with notations summarized in
Table 4.1. Thus, we can rewrite tP as:

tP = 2tlkp + n(2thst + tnet + trsc ), n ≥ 2.
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(4.3)

Table 4.1: Delay notations used in SDN overhead analysis

Symbol
tRAL
tcap
thst
tlkp
t pki
t f md
t f in
tnet
trsc

4.2.2.2

Meaning
Communication between SDN app and RAL server
Communication between SDN controller and app
Time between A’s host and switch
Switch flow table lookup time
Switch Packet In message to controller
Controller’s FlowMod message to switch
Switch flow rule intallation time
Communication delay between A and B edge switches
Server resource rendering time

Reactive Scenario

In the reactive scenario, when there is a hit, the delay is tRh = tP . And when there is a miss, the
end-to-end delay will include all the transactions 1-17 in Figure 4.1. We can express this delay as:

tRm = 10tRAL + 4tcap + 2(tlkp + t pki + t f md + t f in )
+n(2thst + tnet + trsc ), n ≥ 2.

(4.4)

Using the probability of hit from (4.2), we, then, write the average delay for our reactive SDN
setup as:

tR = phit × tRh + (1 − phit ) × tRm
= phit tP + tRm − phit tRm .

(4.5)

We can formulate the additional delay overhead of the reactive SDN setup as tR − tP . Subtracting

58

tP from (4.5) and simplifying, we get:

tR − tP = (tRm − tP )(1 − phit ).

(4.6)

Using (4.3) and (4.4), we write the first term of (4.6) as:

tRm − tP = 2(5tRAL + 2tcap + t pki + t f md + t f in ).

(4.7)

Thus, substituting (4.7) in (4.6), the overhead is:

tR − tP = 2(1 − phit )c,

(4.8)

where

c = 5tRAL + 2tcap + t pki + t f md + t f in .

(4.9)

Here, c is the additional delay caused by agency A’s flow table miss due to the reactive operation
of informing the other agency as well as installing a new flow entry to the tables at both sides.
According to a study by Cedexis Inc., the average cloud latency of major cloud service providers
ranges between 63 ms and 104 ms [85]. If we assume RAL to be located in the largest average
latency region, then we can consider tRAL = 104 ms. The delay between the switch and controller
is based on several factors such as a) the switch generating a Packet In message to be sent to
the controller, b) time to send the message to the controller, c) time for the controller to process
the Packet In message and communicating with the SDN reactive control application on how to
proceed, d) time to generate OpenFlow control messages to send back to the switch, e) delay at the
switch to receive a response from the controller in the form of FlowMod OpenFlow message(s),
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f) delay in installing the rule(s) which has to take into consideration the priority of rule(s) being
installed and existing rules, and g) determination of evicting an existing rule (for example, using
a Least Recently Used strategy) to make space for this new entry, should the flow table be at full
capacity. These delays are dependent upon the optimizations implemented by the chipset vendor.
For example, on Intel, the average delay of a)-b) is 8 ms per packet; and on Broadcom, the average
delay of e)-f) varies between 3 ms and 30 ms [86]. The delay incurred by a TCAM-based flow table
for rule installation varies between 33 ms to 400 ms in current OpenFlow implementations [87],
with optimizations that improve the update delay to a median of less than 12 ms as shown in [88].
Using the end values of these ranges, we assume t pki = 8 ms, t f md = 30 ms and t f in = 400 ms.
Most reactive SDN applications are implemented in the same virtual machine or sometimes as an
extension of the controller thread. In Floodlight, which is used in our experimental setup, there is
no additional network delay for communication between controller and reactive application since
it requires the reactive application to reside in the controller’s process thread as an extension. So,
we assume the delay between the SDN controller and the reactive application tcap is negligible.
Bringing all of these time delays together, for the rest of the theoretical study, we anticipate c ≈ 1 s
in the current OpenFlow implementations and cloud services. Figure 4.5 plots the overhead defined
in (4.8) against varying λ and τ, and shows that as the idle timeout is increased, the reactive SDN
application delay decreases and converges to the proactive case.

4.2.3

Optimizing the Idle Timer

As we have been studying, a key factor in the design of our reactive SDN application is the idle
timer τ. From Figure 4.5, larger idle timer reduces the overhead of the distributed reactive SDN
setup’s end-to-end delay in serving the application running in agency A. As τ increases, the additional delay due to the reactive operation reduces and the overall delay in the reactive design gets
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Figure 4.5: The reactive SDN overhead (in terms of delay) for different flow expiration timer (τ)
values and flow rates (λ ), when N = 1, 000 and σ = 200, where N is the total different number of
flows possible, and σ is the flow table size.

closer to the delay in the proactive case. However, the other metric that plays a key role here is
the flow table size. Given the probability of hit for a newly arriving flow is phit from (4.2), we can
express the average flow table size as:

Favg = phit N.

(4.10)

The above formulation also expresses the number of flows that are active in steady state.
In the proactive case, we assume the flow table size to be equivalent to (or greater than) all possible
flows N. Yet, this is not realistic as a typical SDN setup may encounter millions of different flows.
To find a middle ground, we can optimize the idle timer of our reactive SDN design so that both
the reactive SDN delay overhead and the average flow table size are minimized. To do so, we
update the performance formulations of the reactive case so that the flow table capacity is not an
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issue, i.e., σ = N and compare the reactive delay overhead to the average flow table size as shown
in Figure 4.6.

4.3

Network Emulation of Reactive SDN Application

In this section, we describe our reactive SDN simulation setup and present results from our experiments.
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4.3.1

Simulation Setup

The simulation setup consists of four VirtualBox Virtual Machines (VMs) on a host laptop as
shown in Figure 4.7. Two of the VMs are running Floodlight ver. 1.0 controller [89] each with
our custom reactive SDN application. Each Floodlight VM serves as the remote controller for a
Mininet VM with a custom topology of a switch and two hosts. The two Mininet VMs represent a
network belonging to different agencies and are able to send packets to each other over a Generic
Routing Encapsulation (GRE) Tunnel. The RAL server, implemented as a multi-threaded Java
server application, resides at the host machine where the VirtualBox is running.
Floodlight VM FLVM1
192.168.56.101
SDN
App

192.168.1.183, port 5999
WebSocket

RAL
Client

SDN Controller C1

Mininet VM 1
192.168.56.102
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192.168.56.103
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OpenFlow

SDN
App

SDN Controller C2

OpenFlow
GRE Tunnel

Mininet VM2
192.168.56.104

Switch s2

Switch s1

Host h1

Host h2

Host h3

Host h4

10.0.0.1

10.0.0.2

10.0.1.1

10.0.1.2

Figure 4.7: Reactive SDN setup with two Floodlight VMs, two Mininet VMs, and a host running
the RAL server.
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4.3.2

Proof of Concept Experiments and Results

Two different experiments were conducted to show that our reactive SDN application works successfully.
Test 1 – SimpleHTTPServer In the first test, we registered hosts h1 and h4 with the RAL server,
with h4 running SimpleHTTPServer at port 80. Then, we used the wget command to access this
server from host h1 and then from h2. As expected, Figure 4.8 shows that h1 wget h4 is successful
and we can see the page was returned. However, the request from h2 failed because h2 is not
registered with the RAL server. The dump-flows of the two switches after the successful wget
request from h1 and h4 shows that both have three rules installed to allow TCP traffic from h1 to

SimpleHTTPServer: flows,
Allow

h4 and from h4 to h1 and to drop any other TCP traffic with a low priority.

Test1: SimpleHTTPServer
h1 wget h4 is successful

Rule 3
Rule 2
Rule 1

Rule 3
Rule 2
h2 wget h4 failed

Rule 1

(b) Flow entries in flow tables

(a) Request and response

Figure 4.8: With h1 and h4 registered and h2 not registered with RAL server, h1 wget h4 is
successful while h2 wget h4 times out as shown in (a). Rules 1, 2 and 3 are installed on both
switches after h1 wget h4 as shown in (b).

Test 2 – iperf Server Second experiment was done by running iperf server on port 5,001 on
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the registered host h4 and running the iperf client first between the registered hosts h1 and h4
and then between the unregistered host h2 and the registered host h4. As expected, the request
for registered resource h1 to h4 was successful but for unregistered resource h2, it timed out and
failed. Dump of the flow tables revealed the allow rules for this flow that was installed on both
Mininets automatically by our distributed reactive SDN application.
Extending this Mininet implementation to a more realistic setting is straightforward. To do so,
one needs to replace the GRE tunnel between the two VMs with Internet and making the VMs
reachable from the public Internet.

4.3.3

Challenges to Practice

In the reactive SDN application, the inter-play between idle timeout of different rules as well as the
priority of the rules determines the overall behavior, and therefore, both of these should be carefully
selected. Assume that the flow table is empty and an invalid request comes in, meaning either
source or destination or both are not registered with the RAL server. This would result in Rule 4
being added to the switch and no other rule. If Rule 4 is not specific enough, e.g., if it includes a
match on only source and destination IP but not port number, it may cause subsequent new flows
that match it on source and destination to be dropped instead of being sent to the controller as a
new flow should be. So, one should create drop rules to be very specific and include all the fields in
the match headers as much as possible. Secondly, the drop rules should have a small idle timeout
to allow dropping of the current packet. If a new agency gets registered with the RAL server after
a drop rule was already inserted into the switch for that agency, then a smaller idle timeout would
ensure that we get to query the RAL server again for a flow involving this newly registered agency
and then have an opportunity to add new flow rules.
Assume now that the flow table is empty and a valid TCP request comes in for a registered source
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and registered destination. The reactive SDN application module installs three rules in the switch,
one each to allow the bidirectional TCP traffic flow between the registered source and destination,
and a third one to drop any other packet. The problem here is again the same: If an invalid request
follows, then, Rule 3’s idle counter gets reset while Rule 1 and Rule 2 remain idle and get expired
earlier than Rule 3. This may result in denial of service, if back-to-back invalid requests are
received. This denial of services is not because the controller cannot respond to the frequency of
Packet In messages but because the Packet In messages are not being sent to the controller as they
keep getting matched to Rule 3. A new agency might have already registered with the RAL server
but Rule 3’s idle timeout may not have expired yet and would not allow the reactive application to
query the RAL server to install the allow rules Rule 1 and Rule 2. The solution here is to keep the
idle timeout of Rule 3 very small, e.g., 1 second; or, to set a hard timeout to expire this rule (after
e.g., 5 seconds) regardless of activity. This behavior is similar to a user’s account on a website
getting locked after several invalid attempts and the lockout set to expire after a period of time
such as 15 minutes.
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CHAPTER 5: EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF THE REACTIVE
AND PROACTIVE SDN FRAMEWORKS

For the distributed, reactive SDN application, we have done a theoretical analysis and a Java-based
simulation that matches the theoretical analysis in Chapter 4. We also did a proof of concept
prototype of the reactive SDN application using Mininet with Floodlight remote controller. Next,
we add a traffic generator to the Mininet setup and run practical experiments to evaluate how
observed delays with our proposed framework measure up to the analytical model. Using this
setup, we experimentally compare our reactive SDN framework to the proactive case in terms of
experienced delay. In this chapter, we implement our architecture in Floodlight and Mininet, scale
it to multiple senders and receivers, and study the performance of the reactive SDN delay in the
context of flow rule expiration (idle) timers as well as flow table size limitations. Particularly, we
scale the number of senders and receivers that could potentially belong to different organizations,
but here we have studied them as part of two separate Mininet networks, each in its own VM
(due to limitation of resources in our experimental environment). We first describe the various
components that are part of the experimental setup, and analyze results from experiments we have
done using this setup 1 .

5.1

Integration with a Traffic Generator

Distributed Internet Traffic Generator (D-ITG) is a packet-level network traffic generator created
by Avallone et al. that can generate TCP and UDP traffic flows with inter-packet times and packet
sizes following statistical distributions like Poisson, Gamma, Pareto, and Exponential [31]. It can
be used to measure one way trip time or round-trip time, jitter, packet loss, and throughput. Logs
1 Code

for Sections 5.1-5.4 is located at https://github.com/shafaqch/Reactive-Distributed-SDN.
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related to the traffic flow can be generated and stored either locally on the sender and receiver or
on a remote server. We use three main programs from the D-ITG suite: ITGSend, ITGRecv, and
ITGDec. ITGSend can generate traffic flows at the host where it is run with options specifying
the type of flow, duration, destination, protocol, packet size and many more. It is a multi-threaded
program and so can generate multiple flows, each running in its own thread and all threads managed
by a controller thread. ITGRecv can be run at the host acting as the service provider, for example,
running a server or database. ITGRecv is also a multi-threaded program that spawns new threads
for each new connection request from an ITGSend program. To read and analyze the logs, we will
use ITGDec program to decode the binary log files to text. The whole setup is shown in Figure 5.1.
In order to generate Poisson traffic, we use Exponential inter-packet arrivals, setting it to various
values of the rate parameter, λ , to match the simulation in Section 4.3. Next, we need to generate
N flows. D-ITG can support multiple flow generation by creating a script file to load into the
ITGSend command. We generate multiple such script files through Python to feed to multiple
ITGSend commands. Although D-ITG has the ability to consider a distribution for packet size, we
have considered a constant packet size in our experimental setup.
At the end of the flows, log files are generated at both the sender and the receiver. These log files
can be decoded using the ITGDec program to read the various measurements such as flows sent,
packets sent, packets dropped, delay, and jitter. In our setup, we have n sender and receiver host
pairs, each generating a set of sender and receiver log files with information on f flows. Thus,
there is a need to combine the measurements from multiple send and receive log files to measure
the total packets sent, packets dropped, and delay for all the N = n f flows. So, we wrote a simple
bash script for this that uses the ITGDec program and AWK utility to get this information.
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Figure 5.1: Reactive SDN architecture with RAL server, Floodlight controllers, Mininet topologies
and and D-ITG traffic generator.

5.1.1

Traffic Generation Script

Algorithm 8 generates script files, each with f flows, for h sender-receiver host pairs so we can
start an ITGSend process with multiple flows on each sender host, with packet inter-departure times
following an Exponential distribution with rate parameter λ . Each script file contains flows to a
destination host in the receiving agency’s network and the f flows are differentiated by different
port numbers ranging from 50, 000 to 50, 049. (Note that port numbers can range from 0 to 65, 535,
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with 49, 152 above for dynamically assigned ephemeral ports [90].) Thus, this generates N = ∑ fi, j
flows, where i is host 1 to h and j is port x to (x + f ), x = 50, 000; each flow fi, j is identified by the
tuple <Source IP Address, Source Port Number, Destination IP Address, Destination Port Number,
Traffic Type>. Each packet in each flow is assumed to be of size 512 bytes. In this script, we also
set the duration of each flow to be 5 minutes. The generated files have embedded in their filename
the protocol type, value of λ , flows per sender, f , and the destination’s address to which all the f
flows within that script file are destined. This allows us later to automatically pick up a script file
for each sender host in our sending agency’s network instantiation.
Input
: List of parameters defined below
Parameter: Rate parameter, λ assuming exponential inter-arrival time
Parameter: Number of flows f per (sender, receiver) pair
Parameter: Number of hosts, h in the network
Parameter: Network prefix network_pre f ix of the destination network
Parameter: Flow duration duration in milliseconds for each flow generated by ITGSend
Parameter: Protocol prot, either UDP or TCP
Result: Generates h script files for ITGSend to use. Each script file will have f flows of type UDP or
TCP for the destination network_pre f ix.i with i is 1 to h.
for j ← 1 to h do
destaddr j ← network_prefix.j
f ilename j ← multiflow< prot >-< lambda >-< f lows >-< destaddr j >
Open f ilename j
for i ← 1 to f do
dest porti ← 50, 000 + i
if prot = UDP then
//define UDP flow fi string for input to ITGSend
fi ← −a destaddr j −rp dest porti −E λ −c 512 −T UDP −t duration
else
//define TCP flow fi for input to ITGSend
fi ← −a destaddr j −rp dest porti −E λ −c 512 −T TCP −m RT T M −t duration
end
write flow fi to file f ilename j
end
Close f ilename j
end

Algorithm 8: Script file for generating traffic scripts for h hosts with f flows each; the script
files will be used by the ITGSend process.
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5.1.2

Delay Measurement Meter for UDP versus TCP

The ITGSend command has a flag called meter (−m) to signify if we want to measure one-way
delay (−m OW DM) or round-trip delay (−m RT T M) [91]. When the one-way delay meter is
specified, the log files generated by the ITGRecv has the transmission time of a packet set by
ITGSend and the received time set by the ITGRecv process. This means that the delay value in
the log file at the receiver measures the one-way delay. When the round-trip time delay meter is
specified, then the log file generated by the ITGSend has the transmission time and the received
time of a packet set by the sender; in that case the sender log file’s delay measurement shows
the round-trip delay of the packet. Thus, in Algorithm 8, we use the RTTM meter for TCP traffic
generation and the OWDM meter (which is the default) for UDP traffic generation. Note that when
using OWDM, the log file at the sender will show a delay value of 0 as the received time is set to
the transmission time.

5.2

Network Instantiation

We considered two sets of participant nodes. One set represents data senders and the other set
represents data sinks. Each of these groups is assumed to be part of a different organization being
controlled by its own SDN controller. The network setup involves not only the Mininet topologies,
but also the OpenFlow virtual switch configurations that will differ based on whether we are running the topology in proactive or reactive mode, whether we want to set up an overflow policy, and
whether the traffic is UDP or TCP. Additionally, this part of the set up will also start the sender and
receiver processes described in the previous section.
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5.2.1

Topology Setup with Traffic Generators for Senders

Topology of the sender network is defined using Mininet’s Python API [92] in Algorithm 9. The
topology generation code for the network with the sender hosts takes several parameters that are
described in detail below.

• <controller_ip> is the IP of the remote Floodlight controller this network will connect to;
Controller port is assumed to be 6, 653 but can be configured as a separate parameter as
needed.
• <simmode> set to ‘p’ for proactive mode and ‘r’ for reactive mode. Proactive mode will
install proactive rules in the switch for allowing UDP or TCP traffic depending upon the
value of the protocol parameter, <ud portcp>. The configured proactive rules are described
in detail in Section 5.2.3. In the reactive mode, a couple of proactive rules are pre-configured
permanent flows to allow Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) and D-ITG signaling.
• <lambda> is the rate parameter, λ assuming Exponential inter-arrival time of flow packets
at source network’s switch.
• < f lows> this is the number of flows per ITGSend that will get generated; so in all the total
number of flows generated is, N =< numo f hosts > ∗ < f lows >.
• <numo f hosts> is the number of hosts in the sender network. For each host in <numo f hosts>,
an xTerm (terminal emulator for X Window System) will be opened and an ITGSend process
will be started on it; each ITGSend will input a script file for multiple flows (Section 5.1.1);
each script file has <flows> individual flows.
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• <tau> is the expiration time (idle time out) of reactive rules inserted by Floodlight; the time
after which the flow rule will expire and be removed from the flow table due to inactivity. This is a parameter here so that the log file can be named to include the value of this
parameter; it is not used for any other logic in the code.
• <sigma> this value is to set a limit on number of flows in the flow table of the switch if
<simmode> is set to ‘r’. When <simmode> is set to ‘p’, then passing in <sigma> has no effect. The code will set f low_limit = sigma + x, where x is the number of proactive rules inserted as part of reactive set up. The overflow policy will impose an eviction of an ephemeral
rule that is close to expiration when f low_limit has been reached.
• <ud portcp> is either ‘u’ for UDP or ‘t’ for TCP. If UDP is selected and mode <simmode>
selected as ‘p’, then a no-expiration flow rule for allowing UDP traffic will be inserted.
Similarly, if TCP is selected with <simmode> ‘p’, then a proactive rule for allowing any
TCP traffic will be inserted.

5.2.2

Topology Setup with Traffic Receivers

The topology generation code for the network with the receiving hosts is presented in Algorithm 10
and takes several parameters that are described in detail below.

• <controller_ip> is the IP address of the remote Floodlight controller that the switch will
connect; it must be running before starting the Mininet script. Also, the port where controller
is listening is assumed to be 6, 653 but can be configured as a separate parameter as needed.
• <simmode> set to ‘p’ for proactive mode and ‘r’ for reactive mode. Proactive mode will
install proactive rules in the switch for allowing UDP or TCP traffic depending upon the
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Input
: List of parameters defined below
Parameter: <controller_ip> is the IP of the remote controller; Controller port is assumed to be 6, 653
Parameter: <simmode> set to ‘p’ for proactive mode and ‘r’ for reactive mode
Parameter: <lambda> rate parameter, λ
Parameter: < f lows> this is the number of flows that will get generated per ITG sender
Parameter: <tau> is the expiration time (idle time out) of reactive rules
Parameter: <numo f hosts> is the number of hosts in the sender network
Parameter: <sigma> to set a flow threshold for the switch’s flow table
Parameter: <ud portcp> is either ‘u’ for UDP or ‘t’ for TCP
Result: Generates the sender’s network connected to a remote controller. For each host, it starts an
xTerm with an an ITGSend for <flows> number of flows.
Create a network of type Mininet
Add remote Floodlight controller using the <controller_ip> and port 6653
Add switch to the network supporting OpenFlow v1.0 protocol
for h ← 1 to <numofhosts> do
Add host to network
Add link from host to switch
end
Start network
Configure GRE tunnel to receiver network’s switch using ovs-vsctl command
if <simmode> = ‘r’ then
f low_limit ←< sigma > +6
Configure overflow policy using the ovs-vsctl command
else
if <udportcp> = ‘u’ then
Configure proactive rule with no expiration timer to allow all UDP traffic
else
Configure proactive rule with no expiration timer to allow all TCP traffic
end
end
for i ← 1 to <numofhosts> do
Set destination address
Set file name of the script file with flows to this destination address
Set file name of the log file generated at the sender
Set file name of the log file geenrated at the receiver
Start a terminal with the bash command to run the ITGSend process with the f low_ f ile_name,
send_ f ile_name and recv_log_ f ilen ames as arguments
end

Algorithm 9: Algorithm to generate Mininet topology for sender network, configure proactive
rules, enable overflow policy if needed and start the traffic generator for all the sending hosts.
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value of protocol, <ud portcp>. This is described in detail in Section 5.2.3. In the reactive
mode, Floodlight controller will install the rules when switch sends Packet In messages to
the controller and a couple of proactive rules are pre-configured to allow ARP, ICMP and
D-ITG Signaling.
• <numo f hosts> is needed so that for each host an xTerm will be run and each xTerm will the
ITGRecv process, which is the listening for the D-ITG traffic sender.
• <sigma> this is the overflow policy, if this parameter is set then it will only be used in the
reactive case if <simmode> is set to ‘r’. If the value of this parameter is 100, then after 100
flow rules have been installed by the Floodlight controller, upon the 101th rule, the switch
will evict one of the ephemeral rules. Note that the code will set f low_limit = sigma + x;
where x is the count of proactive rules installed for ARP, ICMP and D-ITG signaling and
it will set the overflow policy of the switch to evict. This deletes the flow that will expire
soonest, meaning a flow that was either idle for a long time and it going to expire soon; or a
flow that is reaching its hard timeout value.
• <ud portcp> is either ‘u’ for UDP or ‘t’ for TCP. If UDP is selected and mode <simmode>
selected is ‘p’, then a no-expiration flow rule for allowing UDP traffic will be inserted.
Similarly, if TCP is selected with <simmode> ‘p’, then a proactive rule for allow any TCP
traffic will be inserted.

5.2.3

Proactive Rule Configuration

As part of network instantiation, we installed some proactive rules in the switch to handle packets other than the unmatched UDP/TCP packets that our reactive SDN module, XTalker, would
intercept and install rules for, for example, the ICMP or ARP messages. Proactive configuration
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Input
: List of parameters defined below
Parameter: <controller_ip> is the IP of the remote controller; Controller port is assumed to be 6653
Parameter: <simmode> set to ‘p’ for proactive mode and ‘r’ for reactive mode
Parameter: <numo f hosts> is the number of hosts in the receiver network
Parameter: <sigma> to set a flow threshold for the switch’s flow table
Parameter: <ud portcp> is either ‘u’ for UDP or ‘t’ for TCP
Result: Generates the receiving agency network; connects to a remote controller and forms a GRE
tunnel with the sending agency network’s switch.
Create a network of type Mininet;
Add remote Floodlight controller using the <controller_ip> and port 6, 653;
Add switch to the network supporting OpenFlow v1.0 protocol;
for h ← 1 to <numofhosts> do
Add host to network;
Add link from host to switch;
end
Start network;
Configure GRE tunnel to the sender network’s switch using ovs-vsctl command;
Configure proactive rules to allow DITG signaling, ARP and ICMP traffic;
if <simmode> = ‘r’ then
f low_limit ←< sigma > +6;
Configure overflow policy using the ovs-vsctl command;
else
if <udportcp> = ‘u’ then
Configure proactive rule with no expiration timer to allow all UDP traffic;
else
Configure proactive rule with no expiration timer to allow all TCP traffic;
end
end
for h ← 1 to <numofhosts> do
Start a terminal with the bash command to run the ITGRecv process;
end

Algorithm 10: Algorithm to generate Mininet topology for receiver network, configure proactive rules, configure overflow policy if needed and start the ITG receiver process on all the
receiving hosts.
of rules for these types of messages allows us to match up the packets sent and packets received
in the duration of an experimental run with the packets recorded in the ITG logs; and for any rule
evictions to be only for the rules installed by our reactive SDN module. We thus identified the
following rules for pre-configuration in the sender and receiver switches to serve our experimental
setup:
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1. Static broadcast rule to handle ARP flooding (Ethernet Type 0x0806)
2. Static rule to handle ARP reply (Ethernet Type 0x0806)
3. Static flow entry for ICMP echo request (Ethernet Type Ethernet Type 0x0800, network
protocol 1)
4. Static flow entry to handle ICMP echo reply (Ethernet Type 0x0800, network protocol 1)
5. Static flow rule to handle ITG signaling traffic (TCP) to destination port 9,000 (Ethernet
Type 0x0800, network protocol 6)
6. Static flow rule to handle ITG signaling traffic (TCP) from source port 9,000 (Ethernet Type
0x0800, network protocol 6)

Here, ARP [93] serves to translate IP addresses to physical addresses, i.e., Media Access Control
(MAC) addresses by broadcasting an ARP request packet and the ARP response with the MAC
address of the device that matches the IP address. These are periodically sent as the resolved
addresses stored in the ARP cache expire. Proactive rules to handle this traffic were installed so
these packets do not come to the XTalker for reactive rule installation.
The ICMP protocol [94] is used to send control messages or for reporting errors, for example if
buffer capacity is maxed out at a router, or when a receiver finds the incoming traffic rate too
high and informs the sender to slow down. For our experimental setup, we allow the ICMP echo
request and echo reply so we can use the ping utility which makes use of these two messages to
test connectivity between two devices. Thus, we configured the ICMP echo request and reply rules
proactively.
The D-ITG architecture implements a TCP signaling channel between every pair of ITGSend
and ITGRecv processes to talk to each other using the Traffic Specification Protocol (TSP) de77

scribed [31]. TSP handles connection creation and closing, exchanging generation parameters,
detecting a generation event, etc. The ITGRecv daemon listens on port 9,000 (default port number
for signaling channel destination port) for a TSP connection and spawns a new thread to receive
each flow. So, the switch must be able to forward signaling traffic (TCP) to the ITGRecv process
destined for port 9,000 and be able to receive information exchanged as part of TSP protocol from
the ITGRecv’s source port 9,000. In our experiments, we chose to go with the default destination
port number for the signaling channel. Although the architecture allows you to choose a signaling
destination port, this was working for a single flow but not for multiple flows generated as part of
a script file.

5.2.4

Measuring Delay for the Proactive Case

Recall that, in Section 4.2.2, the overhead for the reactive SDN architecture was formulated by
measuring the delay in the proactive scenario and subtracting that from the delay in the reactive
scenario. In order to emulate the proactive scenario, we install all the flow rules a priori into the
flow table based on the traffic flows we are planning to generate. In order for the experiment to
behave as a proactive application, we generate flow rules to allow the specific traffic such that the
flow rules never expire. In OpenFlow, each flow rule has a set of timers associated with it: an
idle timeout, and a hard timeout that can be set by the controller. A flow rule is removed from
the flow table if no packets are matched to it after the time duration (in seconds) specified in the
idle timeout. A flow rule is also removed from the flow table regardless of idle time, if the elapsed
time is equal to the hard timeout value. The hard timeout value can be set from 0 to 65, 535
seconds, and when it is set to 0, it indicates a no-expiration flow rule. In our experimental setup,
we used ovs−ofctl add−flow command during the Mininet network instantiation to configure the
OpenFlow virtual switches with the proactive rules based on the traffic type.
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Alternatively, we can also use the OpenFlow flow modification command from the Floodlight controller to the OpenFlow switch to insert flow rules while setting the hard timeout to 0 for all the
entries to match against the traffic flows in the traffic generation script. In this case, there would
be delay due to the initial flow set up time as controller adds flows to the switch through OpenFlow commands but subsequent packets for these flows will be matched in the switch’s flow table
and not incur any additional delay until the switch-controller connection resets. Depending upon
the configuration of the controller, it may be set to clear the switch’s flow table after exchanging handshake messages and OpenFlow channel establishment (either TCP or secure channel like
TLS).
Proactive flow rules can also be inserted by using the Static Entry Pusher, Floodlight’s REST
API accessed at http ://< controller_ip >:8080/wm/ staticentrypusher / json, using the curl program and formulating the flow rule as a JSON [95]. This requires the knowledge of the Data Path
Id (dpid) of the switch, which can be obtained using the ovs−ofctl show br−int command.

5.2.5

Overflow Policy to Emulate Flow Table Size

One of the parameters we studied in our delay analysis was the flow table size which is typically
limited as compared to the number of possible flows. This is one of the benefits of a reactive
design in that it allows efficient use of the flow table, when number of possible flows can be
much larger than the size of a switch’s flow table, typically implemented with Ternary Content
Addressable Memory (TCAM). We saw in our simulation results in Figure 4.3 how incoming
flows were handled with a flow table size 1/5th of the number of possible flows.
In order to emulate flow table size limitation, we configured a soft-limit on the OpenFlow virtual switches by updating the configuration of the vSwitch using the ovs-vsctl [96] utility to set
over f low_policy = evict and set the threshold on the number of flows that can be active in the
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switch using the f low_limit option [97]. When number of active flows in the flow table reaches
the f low_limit, the switch chooses a flow bound for expiration soonest as candidate for eviction;
this implies the rule has not been used in a while, and so approximates the Least Recently Used
(LRU) policy. The value of the f low_limit threshold is governed by σ in our analytical model.
Alternatively, an overflow policy can also be implemented in the controller where it keeps track of
all rules that have been inserted so far along with any rules that have been removed from the flow
table. This is achieved by having the switch send an asynchronous OpenFlow message to the controller when a rule is removed from its flow table, provided that rule was originally added by the
controller with a flag (OFPFF_SEND_FLOW_REM) specifying to send an Open Flow message
back to the controller from the switch when a rule is expelled from the flow table.
When a Packet In OpenFlow message is processed by the controller and it decides to send a Flow−
Add instruction to the OF vSwitch, and if the switch has already reached its full capacity of flow
rules, it will first choose a rule to evict and then insert the new rule before proceeding with the
packet. The flow limit is defined as the maximum number of both proactive and reactive rules
residing in the flow table. In our algorithm, we exclude the proactive rules from the threshold
count by adding to σ the number of proactive flow rules we added during network instantiation.
Packet handling by the switch and controller using proactive and reactive rules in the context of
overflow policy is depicted in Figure 5.2.
While studying the average hit ratio of the flow table or the flow table occupancy, we must remember that the flow rules are kicked out of the flow table in four cases: hard timeout, idle timeout,
eviction due to overflow, or an explicit Flow − Delete OpenFlow instruction from the controller to
the switch. In our experimental set up, we have set the hard timeout to be more than the duration of
each of our flows so the rules are not evicted at any time due to hard timeout. Nor does the XTalker
module have any explicit Flow − Delete instructions. So, in our architecture, as time passes, flow
rules are removed from the flow table when they naturally expire due to the idle timeout, τ (set
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Figure 5.2: Packet handling flow for different types of packets, using either proactive or reactive
rules. It shows the steps related to flow table match and flow table size limit.

by the XTalker reactive module); or they are forced to be expelled based on an eviction policy,
governed by σ to make room for a new flow. If the packet arrival rate is high and the flow rule
limit is low, this would cause a lot of evictions, in the worst case scenario at every packet.
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5.3

Floodlight Module - XTalker

The XTalker (i.e., Agency Cross-Talker) is a reactive module we built in the Floodlight controller
using the command syntax for OpenFlow version 1.0 [98]. This module is the heart of the proposed architecture and intercepts any packets not matched by the switch by listening to OpenFlow
Packet In messages from the switch. This allows the XTalker to reactively instruct the switch to
install flow rules to handle this particular type of traffic in future. The XTalker is also responsible
for communication and information exchange with the external RAL server and making decisions
based on information received about participating hosts.
We described a simpler version for proof-of-concept of this module in Chapter 4. The module was
expanded to handle both TCP and UDP traffic as the experimental setup was mostly a study of
UDP flows. Installation of a flow rule in OpenFlow involves setting up a match object to define
the match fields in future packets of the flow; setting up an actions list to define the action(s) the
switch should take when a future packet matches this flow rule in the flow table; and building the
rule using the match and actions list to send to the switch. Several different types of actions can
be specified in a flow rule, for example, forwarding packet to a port, dropping packet, sending to
controller, and modifying one or more fields. For the purpose of this study, we only considered
the NORMAL action for forwarding the packet using traditional switch forwarding plane; and the
DROP action when hosts are not in the RAL server participants’ list.
Because Floodlight can have several reactive modules listening to Packet In events, it is important to set up the XTalker module to process the Packet In message in the desired order before
it is handed off to the subsequent reactive module. We configured the XTalker to run before
Floodlight’s Forwarding module using the isCallbackOrderingPrereq() function of the OpenFlow
message listener [99]. The Forwarding module adds rules with default idle timeout of 5 seconds
and priority 1. In case both XTalker and Forwarding module install flow rules for a particular
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source, destination IP address and port pair, then packets will be matched against the rule inserted
by the XTalker as they have a higher priority 32, 768 than the rules inserted by the Forwarding
module. The XTalker packet handler is described in Algorithm 11.
The XTalker module’s reactive rules work in conjunction with the proactive rules configured during network instantiation. In our experimental setup, we changed the Floodlight controller’s properties to not clear the switch’s flow table after controller-switch handshake, because we wanted our
proactive rules to persist. This was accomplished by setting the following two properties to NO in
the Floodlight’s src/main/resources/floodlightdefault.properties file:

net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.
clearTablesOnInitialHandshakeAsMaster=NO
net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.
clearTablesOnEachTransitionToMaster=NO

5.4

RAL Server and Client

The RAL server has been implemented as a Java application that waits and listens for incoming
connection requests and serving queries about registered hosts. Once a request is received, it
spawns a new socket for sending and receiving data. The data received is going to be a query
from the RAL client with an IP address of a host to determine if this host is registered with the
RAL. After the query is processed by the server, the data sent is the response from the RAL server
in the form of a string. If registered, the RAL server sends back the IP address, otherwise, sends
the string “Unregistered”. In order to scale, the RAL server instantiates with a pool of p threads
and serves each incoming connection request from this pool, thus preventing the RAL server from
generating too many threads and running out of resources. The RAL server also has two functions
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Result: Processes Packet In message received from the switch.
if Packet_In message then
countPacketIns ← countPacketIns + 1
sourceAddress ← getSourceAddressFromPayload()
destinationAddress ← getDestinationAddressFromPayload()
sourcePort ← getSourcePort()
destinationPort ← getDestinationPort()
if packet is IPv4 and protocol is TCP or UDP then
isSourceRegistered = queryRAL(source)
isDestinationRegistered = queryRAL(destination)
if source and destination are registered with RAL then
//Create match object, m and actions list al
m ← (src=source, dest=destination, ip_protocol=TCP or UDP,
destination_port=destinationPort)
al ← (actions=NORMAL)
//Create rule, r to allow traffic from source to destination
r ← createRule(Match Object=m, ActionsList = al)
Send rule to switch using OpenFlow’s FlowMod()
if protocol is TCP then
Send rule to allow traffic from destination to source with Match:(src=destination,
dest=source, ip_protocol=TCP, tcp_source_port=destinationPort), priority=default,
actions=NORMAL
end
else
Send rule to drop traffic with Match:(src=source, dest=destination, ip_protocol=TCP or
UDP, destination_port=destinationPort), actions=DROP, priority=low
end
else
return Command.CONTINUE //allow processing by other handlers
end
end

Algorithm 11: SDN reactive application packet handler, XTalker
for registering and unregistering agencies. At the beginning of our experimental setup, we define
which agencies are registered and register them with the RAL server.
The RAL client has been implemented within the XTalker module in Floodlight controller. When
Floodlight controller program is executed, the RAL client makes a connection request to the RAL
server using the IP address and port number of the RAL server configured in the Floodlight prop-
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erties file. The bound socket is later used by the XTalker module on Packet In events to exchange
information with the RAL server, i.e., to primarily ask the RAL server, given a host IP address, if it
is registered or not and then taking action accordingly.

5.5

Results and Analysis

We studied the average hit ratio of the switch flow tables as well as the impact of the flow rule
idle expiration timer on the reactive SDN overhead for different traffic flow rates. For the reactive
case, we considered that the number of possible flows is greater than the flow table size, σ < N.
For the proactive case, we assumed that all the flow rules to allow traffic were pre-installed on the
flow table switches. We assume the σ value to be the same for both Mininet instances representing
the two networks, A and B with the senders and receivers, respectively. Let ai and bi denote the
member hosts of these networks, respectively. We further assume that all the participating hosts
have been registered with the RAL server. The experiments were all run on a Dell XPS laptop
9380, Intel Core i7-8568U, 1.80GHz processor with 16GB of RAM. Primary operating system was
Windows 10 Home and Oracle’s VirtualBox 6.1 was installed to run the Linux VMs for Mininet
and Floodlight controller.
The order of execution to run the experiment is as follows:

1. Start the Xming server, an X11 display server for Microsoft Windows. This allows us to
launch the ITGSend and ITGRecv on different hosts.
2. Start the RAL server. The server starts listening on port 5, 999 and awaits client connection
requests.
3. Set the parameters for Floodlight controllers, such as controller port, RAL server IP, RAL
server port, and flow rule expiration timer in Floodlight’s default properties file.
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4. Start the two Floodlight controllers and note their IP addresses. Default port numbers for
the controller have been used. Check that the controllers were able to successfully establish
the connection with the RAL server. Controllers will start listening for Packet In messages
(Algorithm 11).
5. Start the Mininet topology for the receiving network, B (Algorithm 10). This also starts all
the receiver processes at the respective hosts, bi . This needs the IP address of the receiving
network’s controller along with the experiment’s parameters.
6. Generate the desired traffic generation scripts (Algorithm 8).
7. Start the Mininet topology for the sending network, A (Algorithm 9). This also starts all the
sender processes at hosts, ai . This needs the IP address of the sender network’s controller
along with the experiment’s parameters.
8. After the experiment ends, run a bash script to splice the results from the binary log files,
first using ITGDec to decode the files to text and then using the AWK utility to search for
the relevant information. The script is run at both networks, A and B, because metrics like
number of packets sent and round-trip time (if TCP) are measured at sender hosts in A, while
metrics like number of packets received, number of packets dropped, and one-way delay are
measured at receiving hosts in B for UDP traffic.

5.5.1

Average Flow Hit Ratio versus Flow Rule Idle Timer

For each run, we get the following measurements from ITG logs: Total flows for all senders; total
packets sent by all senders; total flows seen by receivers; total packets received by all receivers;
packets dropped as measured at receivers; and average delay in seconds (converted later to milliseconds). Furthermore, in the controller, we measure the number of Packet Ins that resulted in
86

flow rule additions in each of the switches, i.e., switch for network A, sa and switch for network B,
sb . Several runs (between 10 and 20) were done for each value of flow rule idle expiration timer,
τ set to various values between 2 and 20. From these measurements, we calculated the average
hit ratio for packets at sa and sb using their respective Packet In counters and the overall packets
received as:

Packets Sent = Packets Received + Packets Dropped
Packets Sent = Flow Table Hits + Flow Table Misses + Packets Dropped
Flow Table Misses = Packet Ins
Flow Table Hits = Packets Received − Packet Ins

Average Hit Ratio = Flow Table Hits/(Flow Table Hits + Flow Table Misses)

(5.1)

Results from our observations of average hit ratio for the switches in both the sender network and
the receiver network are shown in Figure 5.3. The graph shows that as we increase the idle timer
value of the reactive flow rules, the average hit rate of the switch flow tables increases. Actually,
the average hit ratio depends on both the flow rule idle timer and the value σ because both of
these parameters cause the rules to be removed from the flow table. As described in Section 4.2.1,
the probability of hit is proportional to min( Nσ , 1 − e−λ τ ). The measured average hit ratio matches
closely with the phit calculation in our analytical formulation and the trends with increasing τ
match as well. Additionally, the average hit ratio of the switch in the sender network is similar to
that of the receiver network.
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Average Hit Ratio vs. Flow Expiration (Idle) Timer
σ = 200, flow duration = 300 s, N = 500 flows, runs = 10
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Figure 5.3: Average hit ratio for λ = 1/30 and λ = 1/50, σ = 200, 500 UDP flows, observed for
switch in the sender network (denoted in the graph as s1) and the receiver network (s2). The figure
shows that average hit ratio increases as flow rule idle, τ timer is increased. It is observed that both
switches have similar average hit ratios.

5.5.2

SDN Overhead Delay versus Flow Rule Idle Timer

Next, we studied the observed proactive delay and reactive delay for λ = 1/30 and λ = 1/50,
σ = 200, and 500 UDP flows by varying the flow rule idle timer, τ. The results are shown in
Figure 5.4, with each measured data point averaged over 10 runs. It is observed that the average
reactive overhead decreases as τ increases. This means that as flow rules stay idle in the flow table
longer, the probability of packets finding a match increases, thus reducing the number of OpenFlow
Packet Ins sent to the controller, consequently reducing the reactive delay. Barring the value of
σ , if we continue to increase τ, the delay will continue to improve and approach the proactive
delay. We plotted the calculated values of reactive overhead using our theoretical formation of
2(1 − phit )c and observe that the trends match. We had assumed c to be 1 second in Chapter 4;
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however, from our observed values, it is likely that c is much less than 1 second, in the order 10s of
milliseconds for the experimental setup that we have, since RAL server is not running in the cloud
and there is no cloud latency.
Average SDN Overhead Delay vs. Flow Expiration Timer
σ = 200, flow duration = 300 s, N = 500 flows, runs = 10
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Figure 5.4: Reactive SDN overhead observed for λ = 1/30 and λ = 1/50, σ = 200, 500 UDP
flows against flow rule idle timer, τ shows that overhead decreases as τ increases and the trend
matches with theoretical values.

5.5.2.1

Measuring the value of c

If the delay for proactive case is tP and that for reactive case is tR , then the overhead due to running
in reactive mode is tR − tP = 2(1 − phit )c. The value c is composed of several time components
given in (5.2) and explained below.

c = tRAL + tmiss + tσ
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(5.2)

Here, tRAL is the time for querying the RAL server and receiving a response. If tRwoRAL is the delay
measured in the reactive case assuming no calls to the RAL server (i.e., assuming all addresses are
allowed for communication), then the measured value of tRAL is expressed below.

tRAL = tR − tRwoRAL

(5.3)

The term tmiss encompasses the time for the switch to generate and send a Packet In message to the
controller, the time for the controller to process this message (assuming the reactive case with no
RAL communication), the time for the controller to send the OpenFlow Flow − Add instruction to
the switch to add a flow rule to handle packets of this type and the time for the switch to install this
rule. If we run the reactive scenario without RAL server (assuming all addresses allowed) and no
overflow policy assuming incoming flows can fit in the flow table, then the time measured in that
case is tRwoRALwoσ and so, we have

tmiss = (1 − AvgHitRatio) ∗ tRwoRALwoσ .

(5.4)

If an overflow policy is configured at the switch, then the flow rule instruction from the switch
can also result in time by the switch to find a rule to evict, if f low_limit, governed by (σ + any
proactive rules) has been reached. It may also include the time to send an OpenFlow message back
to the controller if the flow rule evicted had the instruction that switch must inform the controller
asynchronously when that happens. We can make measurements of the delay in our reactive framework without the overflow configuration, i.e., tRwoσ , and with the overflow configuration, i.e., tRwσ .
Then, tσ can be calculated from these measured values of delay as:

tσ = tRwσ − tRwoσ
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(5.5)

Substituting tRAL , tmiss and tσ in (5.2), can help us measure the value of c using our reactive framework using the formulation in (5.6).

c = tR − tRwoRAL + (1 − AvgHitRatio) ∗ tRwoRALwoσ + tRwσ − tRwoσ

(5.6)

The real value of c might be higher than this as the RAL server can be running on the Internet and
typical cloud latency studied to be in the range of 63 ms and 104 ms [85].

5.5.3

Experimental Challenges

In this section, we describe some challenges faced during our experimental study that may be
explored in detail later.

5.5.3.1

Overflow Policy and ITGSend

Recall that each new TCP flow with a table miss results in insertion of two flow rules by the SDN
app: one from sender to receiver, S → R and the other from receiver to sender R → S. When we
configure the OpenFlow virtual switch with an overflow policy, a rule eviction purges one flow
from the Flow table, causing issues with the ITGSend process in progress which either errors out
with a connect() error, or FlowSender interruption error. This eviction can happen at either or
both of the sending and receiving switch’s flow table. The result is that the send log file shows
0 flows sent and 0 packets sent. Theoretically speaking, if the S → R rule is evicted, then the
next packet of that flow will install the S → R and R → S pair of rules overwriting the existing
R → S rule. Similarly, if the R → S rule gets removed, then the returning response (ACK) would
trigger the XTalker to install R → S and S → R rule pairs. However, the observed behavior is that
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ITGSend errors out and is unable to finish its logs. Perhaps the rule installation latency is more
than the expected time for ITGSend’s FlowSender process. This needs to be studied in more detail
to understand how ITGSend can remain uninterrupted if OpenFlow vSwitch overflow policy is in
play for TCP flows.

5.5.3.2

Limitations Observed in D-ITG

In our current environment, ITGSend does not work for a script file with more than 53 flows; and
ITGRecv seems to have a limit on how many threads it can spawn, its createThread function threw
an error after receiving more than 378 traffic requests from different ITGSend processes. While
working with multiple ITGSend processes and ITGRecv processes with each ITGSend generating
multiple flows, it was observed that ITGSend takes a long time to finish up the TSP signaling for
all the flows, long after the packets for the flows have stopped. For example, using our hardware,
for flow duration set to one minute, we observed:

• 1 sender 1 receiver with 50 flows (total 50 flows) taking 8 minutes
• 10 senders and 10 receivers with 1 flow (total 10 flows) taking 9-10 minutes
• 10 senders and 10 receivers with 10 flows (total 100 flows) taking 10 minutes
• 10 senders and 10 receivers with 50 flows (total 500 flows) taking 12-15 minutes

The thread management in TSP is adding overhead to the experiment and it is likely dependent
on the resources (CPU and RAM) allocated to the VM. Offloading the ITG receivers and the
Floodlight controllers to separate machines may help with the resource constraints. However, at
this time, we used a single PC for all the four different VMs, i.e., network with senders, network
with receivers, controller for sender network, and controller for receiver network.
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5.5.3.3

Time Synchronization

A key assumption while measuring one-way delay using D-ITG is that both the sender and receiver
hosts have their times synchronized via Network Time Protocol (NTP) or Global Positioning System (GPS), since the transmit time of a packet is set by the sender and the received time by the
receiver. In our experiments, the sending host and the receiving host are on two different Mininet
Virtual Machines with clocks set to synchronize with a pool of NTP servers; information on how
to set this up can be found at the NTP Pool Project website [100]. As per the researchers of the
NTP project, the accuracy can be a few tens of milliseconds on the Internet [101] while on a fast
local area network (LAN) is < 1ms. The measured delay for our experiments is also in the order
of tens of milliseconds and by switching out the default NTP pool with the North America specific
pool zone in the configuration file, we were able to have a client to server offset to a few ms.
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK

In this chapter, we summarize our contributions and highlight some questions for future research
directions.

6.1

Contributions

During large scale disasters, where multiple public safety agencies are involved and volunteer
teams get mobilized, there are scalability and interoperability challenges due to information fragmented over different systems and networks, challenges in communication and coordination of
various parallel rescue efforts and limited personnel available at 9-1-1 call centers. Real-time response is needed as lives are at stake. To solve these challenges, we proposed two frameworks.
We proposed a Smart Public Safety Framework (SPSF) for "online 9-1-1" that uses social media
and community engagement to alleviate the challenges of traditional 9-1-1 service specifically in
large scale disasters when man power is limited both at the call centers and dispatch teams. Key
components of SPSF include a public safety bot with translator AI, request triaging AI, queue
processing and matchmaking, volunteer management and a feedback mechanism for establishing
volunteer credibility. Our delay analysis shows that "online 9-1-1" has delay comparable to traditional 9-1-1 service with the added benefit of being scalable and more responsive during large-scale
disasters, where call centers have limited agents and calls are processed in the order they are received. Also, it is not possible to take a high-priority call that is in call-waiting, while current call
is being answered. Furthermore, an integrated translator service also offers faster help and greater
accessibility to overcome any language barriers. The automatic distress message handling and
processing mechanisms help alleviate the scalability challenges of sparse human agents triaging
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during large-scale emergencies. The volunteer management module helps scale the 9-1-1 response
network by enlisting proactively members from the local community that possess complementary
skills and training; and soliciting their assistance as part of dispatch teams to assist with large
influx of requests. We also proposed a quantitative and qualitative feedback mechanism to build
credibility for volunteer services, with feedback received from peers, other officers, requesters,
etc. Additionally, the system provides a means to keep track of the effort of various disaster teams
to ensure requests are not going unanswered and resources are being assigned judiciously. These
challenges were observed in studying the volunteer effort in recent disasters [25].
Additionally, we introduced a scalable framework for applications that need access to datasets
distributed over large areas and potentially owned by multiple agencies. This type of use case
is still limited to traditional pre-SDN technologies. Enabling SDN for these types of softwaredefined wide area networking (SD-WAN) applications requires SDN frameworks capable of handling multi-institution engagements and controller-to-controller setups. Multi-controller setups
require controller-to-controller communication and coordination to have a consistent, global view
of the network. We have presented a distributed SDN application architecture that enables logically
distributed controllers to jointly install flow rules in real-time within their respective networks by
talking with a trusted third-party, without the need to have a global view of the network. The proposed architecture can be used to facilitate data access for real-time applications, such as public
safety information sharing and access to big datasets distributed with multiple institutions. Key
contributions of this work are:

• A distributed, reactive SDN application for real-time access to another institution’s data store
through an external verification server.
• Detailed protocol design to use the reactive SDN application for cross-institution data access.
• Overhead delay formulation of the reactive SDN application; a simplified analytical model
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to capture the effect of flow table size and flow rule expiration timer on this delay; and a
simplified model that expresses average flow table size with respect to the expiration timer.
• Comparison of the reactive SDN application to a proactive design both in terms of protocol
specifics and performance.
• Experimental evaluation of the reactive SDN application in Floodlight v1.0, Mininet, and
OpenFlow v1.0. This evaluation was based on multiple senders and receivers and studies
the average hit ratio and reactive SDN overhead for flows with inter-arrival packet time
Exponentially distributed.

We anticipate that this approach is scalable to many agencies and does not suffer from traditional
multi-controller design challenges like controller-controller coordination and placement. Furthermore, the controller in one agency does not have to have the global view of the networks of both
agencies which was the case with the East-West Bridge [55]. Agencies can register at any time
with the proposed trusted server, which allows ad-hoc inter-agency communication networks to be
set up and hook into the multi-domain data access framework.

6.2

Future Work

The SPSF concept gives way to several questions and areas of research. The first question is
whether AI-enabled social network-based chatbots can replace a PSAP [102]. While automation
allows us to scale with limited personnel manning 9-1-1 call centers, whether AI can make better
and quicker overall decisions than humans has yet to be proven [103, 70]. Currently, AI’s potential
is to assist the PSAP agents to make better decisions than machine or human alone [64, 66]. And
who is to blame when an AI-assisted decision goes awry? Furthermore, during an emergency,
a person wants to talk/chat with an agent they can trust. How would the requester feel about
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chatting with an AI bot? Will they trust the decisions being made? Research in social chatbots [35]
shows that both emotional quotient and intelligent quotient should be part of the chatbot design to
help the user develop trust in the chatbot. Chatbots have come a long way since ELIZA which
was developed in 1960s as a therapist bot. Some recent examples of chatbots are Microsoft’s
Zo

1

programmed to sound like a teenager in online social platforms like Twitter, Skype, Kik

Messenger, GroupMe and Woebot [104] that has found use in cognitive behavior therapy as a
companion bot to help people with mental health issues. The NADiA architecture features device
cameras for facial expressions to augment automatic speech recognition [105]. But let’s not forget
that building “intelligence” into bots is more than decision-making AI based on trained data-sets,
or understanding human speech patterns and expressions; if these bots are built to just imitate, then
it can result in the racist, anti-Semitic, sexist chatbot Tay that Microsoft was forced to take offline
from Twitter after a day of deployment [106]. What will we need to do to increase people’s trust in
such a system considering most are already singed with automated menus for services like banking,
utilities, and reservations. Perhaps using a combination of deep-learning based technologies like
AWS Lex 2 and AWS Polly 3 , sophisticated natural language-based online 9-1-1 bots can be built.
Another area of exploration is cyber security challenges in the use of social media for public
safety. Information shared by a victim during emergency can identify requesters and should be
exchanged over secure communication channels. However, end-to-end encryption in social media
is a debatable topic as it protect messages but at the same time can enable criminal activity through
private conversations. Social media is also prone to social engineering attacks [107] and public
safety organizational accounts would not be immune from such attacks either. Social media is also
susceptible to Denial of Service type attacks, where people with malicious intent can flood public
safety streams with false reports or unrelated messages, which would require the public safety
1 https://www.zo.ai/
2 https://aws.amazon.com/lex/
3 https://aws.amazon.com/polly/
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chatbot to be intelligent enough to sift through and get to the legitimate messages.
One of the key challenges in the reactive SDN application is to intelligently insert new rules while
resolving conflicts with existing rules added by other modules, for example, there might be a
Firewall module or an Access Control List module. An intelligent algorithm will need to be written
to insert the rules with the right priority among the pre-existing rules and to evaluate and eliminate
any conflicts that are likely to arise.
Another interesting research direction would be to explore application-aware optimization of expiration of the OpenFlow-enabled switch’s Flow Table rules. Recall that an incoming packet’s
probability of matching a flow rule in the Flow Table depends on the flow’s packet arrival rate, the
flow table size and the flow rule expiration timer, τ. One way to optimize the flow expiration timer
can be through optimizing an objective function based on the reactive SDN overhead and average
table size.
Additionally, we would like to port the reactive SDN framework to a network testbed such as
the Global Environment for Network Innovations (GENI) [108] to study scalability of multiple
agencies. GENI is a National Science Foundation sponsored testbed for researching and testing
new network designs. It can be used for running scalable network experiments on sets of GENI
resources called “slices”. The basic idea would be to add resources from different GENI racks
or aggregates to form the Floodlight and Mininet machines representing an agency, and study the
scalability of the framework for multiple agencies. In order to reduce the latency of the controller,
Floodlight VM and Mininet VM of an agency should be run on the same GENI rack as shown in
Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Implementing the Mininet implementation on GENI testbed using resource "slices".
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[87] M. Kuźniar, P. Perešíni, and D. Kostić, “What you need to know about sdn flow tables,”
in Passive and Active Measurement, J. Mirkovic and Y. Liu, Eds.

Cham: Springer Int’l

Publishing, 2015, pp. 347–359.
[88] X. Wen, B. Yang, Y. Chen, L. E. Li, K. Bu, P. Zheng, Y. Yang, and C. Hu, “Ruletris: Minimizing rule update latency for tcam-based sdn switches,” in 2016 IEEE 36th International
Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), June 2016, pp. 179–188.
[89] R. Izard, “Floodlight v1.0,” Accessed on:

12/1/2020. [Online]. Available:

https:

//floodlight.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/floodlightcontroller/pages/1343555/Floodlight+v1.0
[90] M. Cotton, L. Eggert, J. Touch, M. Westerlund, and S. Cheshire, “Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry,” Internet Requests for Comments, Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), RFC 6335, August 2011, Accessed on: 12/1/2020.
[Online]. Available: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6335
[91] Alessio Botta and Walter de Donato and Alberto Dainotti and Stefano Avallone and
Antonio Pescapé, “D-ITG 2.8.1 Manual,” Accessed on: 12/1/2020. [Online]. Available:
http://traffic.comics.unina.it/software/ITG/manual/
[92] “Mininet Python API Reference Manual,” Accessed on: 12/1/2020. [Online]. Available:
http://mininet.org/api/annotated.html

111

[93] D. Plummer, “An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or Converting Network Protocol
Addresses to 48.bit Ethernet Address for Transmission on Ethernet Hardware,” Internet
Requests for Comments, RFC Editor, RFC 826, November 1982. [Online]. Available:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc826
[94] J. Postel, “Internet Control Message Protocol,” Internet Requests for Comments, RFC
Editor, RFC 792, September 1981, Accessed on:

12/1/2020. [Online]. Available:

https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792
[95] R.

Izard,

“Static

Entry

Pusher

API,”

Accessed

on:

12/1/2020.

[Online].

Available: https://floodlight.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/floodlightcontroller/pages/1343518/
Static+Entry+Pusher+API
[96] “Open vswitch manual, ovs-vsctl - utility for querying and configuring ovs-vswitchd,”
Accessed on:

12/1/2020. [Online]. Available:

http://www.openvswitch.org/support/

dist-docs/ovs-vsctl.8.txt
[97] “Open vSwitch Manual, Open_vSwitch - Open_vSwitch database schema,” Accessed on:
12/1/2020. [Online]. Available: http://www.openvswitch.org/ovs-vswitchd.conf.db.5.pdf
[98] Open Networking Foundation, “OpenFlow Switch Specification v1.0,” December 2009,
Accessed on: 12/1/2020. [Online]. Available: https://opennetworking.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/04/openflow-spec-v1.0.0.pdf
[99] R. Izard, “How to Write a Module,” Accessed on:

12/1/2020. [Online]. Avail-

able: https://floodlight.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/floodlightcontroller/pages/1343513/How+
to+Write+a+Module
[100] “NTP Pool Project,” Accessed on: 12/1/2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.pool.ntp.
org/en/use.html
112

[101] “Network Time Synchronization Research Project,” Accessed on: 12/1/2020. [Online].
Available: https://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/ntp.html
[102] T. Paiva, “Will AI Replace Humans in the Customer Service Industry?” forbes.com, Aug.
2017, Accessed on: 12/1/2020. [Online]. Available: http://bit.ly/2KYVQsL
[103] S. M. Schenkel and R. L. Wears, “Triage, Machine Learning, Algorithms, and Becoming
the Borg,” Annals of Emergency Medicine, vol. 71, no. 5, pp. 578 – 580, 2018. [Online].
Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0196064418301410
[104] K. K. Fitzpatrick, A. Darcy, and M. Vierhile, “Delivering Cognitive Behavior Therapy
to Young Adults With Symptoms of Depression and Anxiety Using a Fully Automated
Conversational Agent (Woebot): A Randomized Controlled Trial,” JMIR Ment Health,
vol. 4, no. 2, p. e19, Jun 2017. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.2196/mental.7785
[105] J. Wu, S. Ghosh, M. Chollet, S. Ly, S. Mozgai, and S. Scherer, “NADiA - Towards Neural
Network Driven Virtual Human Conversation Agents,” in Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, ser. AAMAS ’18.
Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
2018, p. 2262–2264.
[106] S. Perez, “Microsoft silences its new A.I. bot Tay, after Twitter users teach it racism,”
2016, Accessed on: 12/1/2020. [Online]. Available: https://techcrunch.com/2016/03/24/
microsoft-silences-its-new-a-i-bot-tay-after-twitter-users-teach-it-racism/
[107] K. Krombholz, H. Hobel, M. Huber, and E. Weippl, “Advanced social engineering
attacks,” Journal of Information Security and Applications, vol. 22, pp. 113 – 122,
2015, special Issue on Security of Information and Networks. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214212614001343

113

[108] M. Berman, C. Elliott, and L. Landweber, “Geni: Large-scale distributed infrastructure for
networking and distributed systems research,” in 2014 IEEE Fifth International Conference
on Communications and Electronics (ICCE), 2014, pp. 156–161.

114

